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1 Introduction
Under what conditions will bilateral exchange be Pareto eﬃcient? Enforceable contracts (Coase
1960) or repeated interaction (Fudenberg & Maskin 1986) can lead to eﬃcient exchange under
some conditions. This paper addresses a third possible source of eﬃciency: a direct concern for the
welfare of the other party, often called distributional preferences, such as altruism or a concern for
fair outcomes.
The setting I analyze is a simple, two-stage bilateral exchange game, e.g., an employer-worker
interaction. The game is defined in terms of “material payoﬀs,” the players’ private utilities that do
not take into account any concern for the other player. Each of the two players in turn chooses how
much of an action to take. For each player, a higher level of his action increases the other player’s
material payoﬀ but at the cost of reducing his own material payoﬀ. For example, by increasing
the wage, an employer increases the worker’s consumption but reduces profit; and by increasing
eﬀort, the worker increases the employer’s profit but incurs disutility of eﬀort. To focus on the
role of distributional preferences, I assume that contracting is infeasible and that the exchange is
one-shot. Hence, if both players were purely self-regarding–caring only about their own material
payoﬀ–then no gains from trade would be realized because neither player would have any reason
to choose a positive amount of his action.
Instead of being purely self-regarding, each player has distributional preferences that depend
on both his own and the other player’s material payoﬀ, and thus players might be willing to choose
a positive action. Moreover, the second-mover’s (SM’s) optimal action may depend on the first-
mover’s (FM’s) action. If so, then even if FM is purely self-regarding, it may turn out to be
optimal for FM to take an action that, together with SM’s optimal response, generates a Pareto
improvement relative to no trade. In fact, it is possible that at the equilibrium of the game, the
outcome is Pareto eﬃcient: all potential gains from trade are realized. I identify properties of the
players’ preferences that may lead the outcome of their interaction to be Pareto eﬃcient.
While much of the literature on distributional preferences assumes a particular model of distri-
butional concerns, I study how results depend on general properties of distributional preferences
that are shared by many specific models. Two properties play a particularly prominent role. The
first is defined in terms of the agent’s interpersonal indiﬀerence curves, which describe how the
agent trades oﬀ between FM’s material payoﬀ and SM’s. The property of “fairness-kinkedness”–
illustrated in Figure 1a, where the axes are SM’s and FM’s material payoﬀs, 2 and 1–means
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that the agent’s indiﬀerence curves are kinked at each material payoﬀ pair along a curve. This
curve, along which both players’ material payoﬀs are increasing, is called the “fairness rule.” The
fairness rule describes the set of material payoﬀ pairs that the agent considers to be “fair.” Be-
cause of the kinked indiﬀerence curves, when facing a choice that requires trading oﬀ between the
players’ material payoﬀs, the agent chooses an action that exactly implements one of these fair
transactions for a range of rates of tradeoﬀ. Several leading models of distributional preferences
satisfy fairness-kinkedness (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Charness & Rabin 2002) because they em-
bed the assumption that indiﬀerence curves are piecewise-linear and kinked at transactions where
the players earn equal material payoﬀs, as illustrated in Figure 1b. The more general property
of fairness-kinkedness, however, can accommodate non-linear indiﬀerence curves and fairness rules
involving unequal material payoﬀs, e.g., a worker may judge as fair the material payoﬀs that corre-
spond to the market rate of exchange between money and eﬀort (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler,
1986).
The second property is “normality”: both players’ material payoﬀs enter the distributional
preferences as “normal goods.” Analogously to consumer theory, normality means that if the frontier
of attainable material payoﬀs for the players shifts outward holding fixed the rate of tradeoﬀ, then
the agent prefers that both players get a higher material payoﬀ. Normality seems like a natural
property for distributional preferences designed to capture a concern for fairness, and indeed most
existing fairness models (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Charness & Rabin 2002) satisfy at least a weak
version of it.
Throughout, I impose two assumptions that rule out potential sources of ineﬃciency. First, I
assume that SM’s distributional preferences are strong enough that FM is willing to transact rather
than take her outside option. Due to this assumption, the eﬃciency results should be interpreted as
describing when exchange is predicted to be eﬃcient, conditional on the players choosing to trade.
Second, I assume that FM is either purely self-regarding–as when FM is a profit-maximizing firm–
or has distributional preferences that are monotonically increasing in both players’ material payoﬀs.
Although existing models allow for distributional preferences to be non-monotonic, this is primarily
to proxy for reciprocity by the second mover, and most of the evidence from simple dictator game
experiments actually indicates that most people have monotonic distributional preferences (e.g.,
Andreoni & Miller 2002; Charness & Rabin 2002; Fisman, Kariv, & Markovits 2007). In Web
Appendix A, I explore how the results are aﬀected if this monotonicity assumption is relaxed.
The central results of the paper describe two main cases in which distributional preferences
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generate eﬃciency in bilateral exchange, and show that these are essentially the only two cases in
which the equilibrium is eﬃcient. In one case, normality plays a key role, and in the other, fairness-
kinkedness does. First, if SM’s distributional preferences satisfy normality, and if SM’s action is a
linear transfer of material payoﬀ from himself to FM–e.g., SM’s action is a monetary payment–
then the equilibrium is eﬃcient. Because SM faces the same linear tradeoﬀ between the players’
material payoﬀs regardless of FM’s action, FM’s action simply shifts the frontier of attainable
material payoﬀs inward or outward. If FM’s action shifts the frontier outward, then since SM’s
distributional preferences satisfy normality, SM will take an action that generates greater material
payoﬀ for both players. Because SM’s behavior ensures that the players’ material incentives are
aligned, FM will take the level of her action that maximizes aggregate material surplus.
The second case does not require SM’s action to be a linear transfer. If SM’s distributional
preferences are suﬃciently fairness-kinked, then he always chooses an action that generates an
outcome that is on the fairness rule. The equilibrium is eﬃcient because, intuitively, when SM
behaves in accordance with a fairness rule (such as the fairness rule shown in Figure 1a), he
aligns the players’ material incentives. Therefore, FM maximizes both players’ material payoﬀs
by choosing the action that induces the highest achievable point on the fairness rule, i.e., where
the fairness rule intersects the frontier of attainable material payoﬀs. Existing laboratory evidence
suggests that such fairness-rule-based behavior is plausible, and indeed the equal-split fairness rule
depicted in Figure 1b often governs behavior in laboratory experiments. The result highlights
the economic relevance of examining empirically how often people feel compelled to behave in
accordance with rules of fair behavior in economic settings outside the laboratory.
As far as I am aware, the eﬃciency result involving fairness-kinkedness is novel. Other results in
this paper generalize and unify results that are known for special cases, while highlighting the largely
unappreciated central roles played by fairness-kinkedness and normality. The analysis also helps
to bridge separate theoretical literatures on altruism, defined as a preference to increase the other
player’s payoﬀ, and fairness concerns, notions of which may be captured by fairness-kinkedness or
normality. For example, the eﬃciency result involving normality generalizes the well-known rotten
kid theorem (Becker 1974; Bergstrom 1989) and shows that, contrary to the theorem’s traditional
interpretation as about altruism, it is actually driven by normality.
Two recent papers take a similar approach to this paper of applying tools from classical demand
theory to analyze implications of general properties of other-regarding preferences. Cox, Friedman,
and Sadiraj (2008) propose axioms that generalize and extend existing models and explore the
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predictions of these axioms in some laboratory games. Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel,
& Sobel (2011) study the implications of general properties of other-regarding preferences in a
general equilibrium environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Using the rotten kid theorem and a gift-exchange
game as examples, and imposing relatively specific assumptions on preferences, Section 2 illustrates
and previews the main results of the paper. Section 3 lays out the more general set-up of the bilateral
exchange game. Section 4 introduces the general properties that distributional preferences might
satisfy. Section 5 shows how the same properties of distributional preferences that can lead to
an eﬃcient outcome–either fairness-kinkedness or normality–are also properties that give rise
to reciprocity-like behavior in the bilateral exchange game. Section 6 characterizes how the set
of outcomes that are eﬃcient when players have distributional preferences relates to (and diﬀers
from) the set of eﬃcient outcomes when both players are purely self-regarding. Section 7 derives
necessary conditions for the equilibrium to be eﬃcient, and shows that the two cases mentioned
above are essentially the only cases in which distributional preferences can generate an eﬃcient
equilibrium. Section 8 provides two sets of suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium to be eﬃcient,
each corresponding to one of the two cases. Section 9 discusses possible extensions of the analysis
and additional testable predictions. Web Appendix A analyzes the case where FM’s distributional
preferences are non-monotonic, and Web Appendix B contains all proofs.
2 Model Set-Up and Illustrative Examples
In this section, I analyze two examples that preview and illustrate the main results of the paper.
The set-up is a sequential bilateral-exchange environment. FM chooses the level of her action,
1 ∈ R, and then SM chooses the level of his action, 2 ∈ R. For each player, a higher level of one’s
action helps the other player but hurts oneself. The material payoﬀ functions, 1 (1 2) and
2 (1 2), describe how the players’ actions determine the “material payoﬀs” from the transac-
tion. Material payoﬀs represent the purely self-regarding component of players’ outcomes from the
transaction but not necessarily their preferences. Preferences are represented by utility functions,
1 (1 2) and 2 (1 2) respectively, which may depend not only on the agent’s own material
payoﬀ but also on the other player’s material payoﬀ. The equilibrium concept is subgame-perfect
equilibrium.
Example 1. The rotten kid game. FM is a child who chooses how much eﬀort 1 to exert
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to earn money for the family. Then SM, the parent, transfers to the child some amount of family
income, 2. The child’s private income is 1 + 2 −  (1), where 1 ≥ 0 is exogenous income,
and  (1) is his cost-of-eﬀort function (in dollars) satisfying 0  0, 00  0, lim→−∞ 0 () = 0,
0 (0)  1, and lim→∞ 0 () = ∞. The parent’s private income is 2 + 1 − 2, where 2 ≥ 0
is an exogenous component of the parent’s income. “Family income” is the sum of the child’s
and parent’s incomes: 1 + 2 + 1 −  (1). The child’s consumption is 1 (1 2) = 1+2−(1)1 ,
where 1  0 is the market price of consumption faced by the child. The parent’s consumption is
2 (1 2) = 2+1−22 , where 2  0 (possibly equal to 1) is the market price of consumption faced
by the parent. The child is purely self-regarding (a “rotten kid”): 1 (1 2) = 1. The parent is
altruistic: 2 (1 2) is not only strictly increasing in 2 but also in 1. It is also assumed that
2 (1 2) is twice-continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly quasi-concave, and 1 and 2 enter 2 as
normal goods. Finally, as a technical condition that serves only to ensure that the parent’s optimal
action is finite, I assume that there exist 1  0 and 2  0 such that lim2→∞ 2(12)22(12)1 = 0
and lim1→∞
2(12)22(12)1 =∞. Becker’s (1974, p.1080) celebrated rotten kid theorem is:
Proposition 1 (Rotten kid theorem). In the equilibrium of the rotten kid game, the child
chooses the level of 1 that maximizes family income.
The rotten kid theorem is generally interpreted as showing that an eﬃcient outcome can occur
within the family due to the parent being altruistic (e.g., Becker, 1974). Bergstrom (1989) pointed
out that Becker’s example hinges on the assumption that the material payoﬀs are quasi-linear in 2
but continued to describe the theorem as a result about altruism. Although typically not defined
explicitly, altruism is usually understood as meaning that preferences depend positively on the
material payoﬀ of the other person. I will refer to this property of distributional preferences as
“monotonicity.”
The analysis in this paper will show that the rotten kid theorem is not driven by monotonicity,
but rather by the combination of the material payoﬀs being quasi-linear in 2 with the “normality”
assumption: 1 and 2 enter 2 as normal goods. Indeed, Theorem 3 in Section 8 is a generalization
of Proposition 1 in which monotonicity is relaxed. Moreover, I will argue that normality captures
a kind of concern for fair distribution; in Example 1, normality means that when family income
increases, the parent prefers that both players share in the material gains. Such a concern for
fairness appears to be widespread in interactions between unrelated individuals (e.g., Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler 1986). Therefore, rather than as a result about altruism within the family, the
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rotten kid theorem should be interpreted as a result about fairness preferences that may be relevant
to a wider range of settings.
Example 2. Gift-exchange game with a profit-maximizing firm. FM is a firm who
chooses a worker’s salary, 1. Then SM, the worker, chooses his level of eﬀort, 2. The firm’s
profit is 1 (1 2) = 2− 1. The worker’s material payoﬀ is 2 (1 2) = 1−  (2), where  (2)
is his cost-of-eﬀort function satisfying  (0) = 0, 0  0, 00  0, lim→−∞ 0 () = 0, 0 (0)  1,
and lim→∞ 0 () =∞. Since the material payoﬀ functions are quasi-linear in 1, any transaction
(1 2) where 0 (2) = 1 is Pareto eﬃcient in terms of the material payoﬀs. The firm is profit
maximizing: 1 (1 2) = 1. Both players anticipate the subgame-perfect equilibrium, and if
either would earn negative utility from the game, then they do not transact and instead each get
an outside-option material payoﬀ of 0. The worker has distributional preferences that are piecewise
linear and hence kinked. The preferences weight the firm’s and workers’s material payoﬀs diﬀerently,
depending on which player earns more:
2 (1 2) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 + (1− )2 if 1  2
1 + (1− )2 if 1 ≤ 2
 (1)
where   1 is the relative weight on the firm’s material payoﬀ when the firm is ahead, and  ∈ ( 1]
is the relative weight on the firm’s material payoﬀ when the worker is ahead. For example, the
set of parameter values that correspond to Fehr & Schmidt’s (1999) inequity-aversion model is
  0    1, while Charness & Rabin (2002) argue that 0      1. Either way, the
equilibrium is eﬃcient if the worker’s distributional preferences are “suﬃciently kinked,” as made
precise in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In the gift-exchange game with a profit-maximizing firm, there exists   0
such that if    and  ≥ 12 , then the equilibrium transaction is Pareto eﬃcient in terms of the
material payoﬀs.
For intuition, it is clearest to begin with the special case  ≤ 0. In that case,  ≥ 12 is not only
suﬃcient but also necessary for the equilibrium transaction to be Pareto eﬃcient in terms of the
material payoﬀs.1 When the worker exerts less than the eﬃcient level of eﬀort, a marginal increase
1One might wonder whether  ≥ 1
2
is empirically plausible. If material payoﬀ functions are quasi-linear in money
(as assumed in Example 2), then  can be estimated from experimental participants’ allocations of money. Fehr
& Schmidt (1999, Table III and p.864) suggest that about 40% of subjects have  ≥ 1
2 . Drawing on a broader set
of experimental games, Charness & Rabin’s (2002, Table VI, row 5) estimates are also consistent with a sizeable
minority of participants satisfying  ≥ 1
2
.
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in eﬀort increases the firm’s material payoﬀ more than it reduces the worker’s. Since  ≥ 12 , the
worker when ahead puts at least as much weight on the firm’s material payoﬀ as his own, but
since  ≤ 0, the worker when behind puts non-positive weight on the firm. Consequently, for any
salary at which the worker ends up exerting less than the eﬃcient level of eﬀort, the worker would
increase his eﬀort exactly up to (and not beyond) the level that equates the firm’s material payoﬀ
with his own. The players’ material incentives are therefore aligned, and the firm maximizes its
own material payoﬀ by setting the salary level that induces the eﬃcient level of eﬀort.
The situation is more complex when   0 because the worker may be willing to increase
his eﬀort beyond the level that equates the material payoﬀs, in which case the players’ material
incentives are no longer aligned. However, if  is small enough, then at relatively high salaries
(which induce high eﬀort and hence a high marginal cost of eﬀort) the worker still increases his
eﬀort only up to the level that equates the material payoﬀs. Even though a relatively low salary
may evoke eﬀort beyond the equal-payoﬀ level, if  is small enough, the eﬀort will be low enough
that the firm could earn higher profit by oﬀering the higher salary that induces the eﬃcient level
of eﬀort.
Theorem 4 in Section 8 generalizes Proposition 2 to a more general class of fairness-kinked
distributional preferences, in which the preferences are convex rather than piecewise-linear, and the
kinks do not necessarily occur at equal material payoﬀs. Unlike in Example 1, where quasi-linearity
of the material payoﬀs is crucial, in Example 2 it merely simplifies stating suﬃcient conditions for
eﬃciency; Theorem 4 allows for more general, convex material-payoﬀ functions. I will argue that
the fairness-kinkedness of the distributional preferences represents another kind of concern for fair
distribution (diﬀerent from normality): a motivation to follow a “rule” of fair behavior described by
the set of material payoﬀs where the kinks occur. In Example 2, the rule is to equalize the players’
material payoﬀs. Thus, Example 2 illustrates a type of eﬃciency result that can arise from fairness
preferences that is distinct from Example 1. Theorems 3 and 4 also generalize the examples in
another way: they show in each case that the equilibrium is–in addition to being Pareto eﬃcient
in terms of material payoﬀs–also Pareto eﬃcient in terms of overall preferences.
3 The Bilateral Exchange Game
In this section, I generalize the games in the examples from the previous section; in the next section,
I generalize the distributional preferences. In addition to the rotten kid game and the gift-exchange
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game, the bilateral exchange environment I introduce in this section includes as special cases the
trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe 1995); a two-player, sequential, public goods game; and a
version of the hold-up problem where, after FM makes a costly irreversible investment, SM has all
the bargaining power in determining how the surplus is divided.
FM chooses the level of her action, 1, and then SM chooses the level of his action, 2. To ensure
that all optimal actions are interior and thereby simplify exposition, I assume that 1 2 ∈ R.2
The outcome of the game is a transaction, (1 2). As in many exchange settings in the field,
I assume that the players could alternatively choose not to transact. In that case, both players
receive an outside-option payoﬀ as if the action pair had been (0 0). The outside-option material
payoﬀs are normalized to zero: 1 (0 0) = 2 (0 0) = 0.
The material payoﬀ functions are twice-continuously diﬀerentiable and have these properties,
which I will always assume:
A1. Each player’s action increases the other player’s material payoﬀ while reducing his or her
own: 11  0, 21  0, 12  0, and 22  0.
A2. There are (material) gains from trade: −1(00)11(00)2  2(00)1−2(00)2 .
A3. The functions e1 (1 2) and e2 (1 2), defined by e1 (1 2) ≡ 1 (−1 2) and e2 (1 2) ≡
1 (1−2), are both weakly concave; and at least one is strictly concave in at least one of its ar-
guments.
A4. (Technical condition) Fixing any b1 and b2, each of the mappings from one agent’s action to
a real number given by 1 (b1 2), 2 (b1 2), 1 (1b2), and 2 (1b2), is surjective.
A2 means that there exist some transactions involving positive actions for both players such that
both earn a positive material payoﬀ: for any suﬃciently small, positive actions 1  0 and 2  0
such that FM’s material payoﬀ equals 0, i.e., 1(00)1 1 + 1(00)2 2 = 0, SM’s material payoﬀ is
strictly positive: 2(00)1 1 + 2(00)2 2  0. A3 helps guarantee that the equilibrium is unique.
Since the action spaces are unbounded, A4 helps ensure that optimal actions exist.
2 In applications, it is instead typical to assume that 1 ∈ 0 1 and 2 ∈ 0 2 for some upper bounds 1 and
2. My assumption that the action spaces are unbounded has the drawback that it necessitates technical conditions
(such as A4 below) to ensure the existence of optimal actions. If the action space were closed and bounded, then
these technical conditions could be eliminated, but the propositions would have to separately deal with cases where
optimal actions are not interior.
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The players maximize their utility functions, which may depend on the material payoﬀs received
by both players (according to properties described in the next section). The solution concept is
subgame-perfect equilibrium. Because payoﬀs and preferences are common knowledge, both players
correctly anticipate the equilibrium of the game. Therefore, if either player would get negative
utility from trading, then the players do not trade.
4 Distributional Preferences
An agent with distributional preferences has preferences that depend on both players’ outcomes.
When studying behavior in experiments, the typical approach is to define distributional preferences
over the players’ incremental monetary payoﬀs earned in the experiment. In many field settings,
however, the players’ actions aﬀect at least one commodity other than money, such as eﬀort. In
order to analyze such settings, I define distributional preferences over the (full) material payoﬀs
from the transaction. This formulation specializes to preferences over incremental monetary payoﬀs
in experiments where the players’ actions only aﬀect their earnings.
In this section, I specify general properties that FM’s and SM’s respective distributional prefer-
ences could satisfy. I begin by defining the two properties that will play a central role in generating
an eﬃcient equilibrium and then turn to properties that primarily serve as regularity conditions.
The first property, which I call “fairness-kinkedness,” formalizes kinked indiﬀerence curves with-
out building in piecewise-linearity or the restriction that the kinks occur at 50-50 split allocations.
While Fehr & Schmidt (1999) interpret the kinks in their model as reflecting loss aversion in social
comparisons, Charness & Rabin (2002) treat the kinks in their own model as just a byproduct of the
simplifying assumption of piecewise-linearity. In any event, the kinks around 50-50 splits account
for some of the descriptive accuracy of these models in laboratory experiments. In particular, as
Fehr & Schmidt (1999) note, the kinks are the feature of the model that enables it to explain why
in dictator games, subjects often give exactly half of the money to the other player (see Camerer
2003 for a review). Moreover, the kinks can explain why many of the same people who choose
exactly even splits in a dictator game also choose to assign equal monetary payoﬀs to themselves
and another player in modified dictator games, where the “price” of increasing one player’s payoﬀ
by $1 is less than $1 (e.g., Andreoni & Miller 2002). No smooth distributional preferences could
explain equal-split behavior in both cases. Hence, a kink in the indiﬀerence curve can be interpreted
as describing a “rule” for how to allocate payoﬀs in the sense that over some range of prices, the
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prescribed behavior is insensitive to the price (see Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009, for an alternative
model based on signaling).
Let a strictly increasing function  (2) describe what the agent considers to be a “fair” ma-
terial payoﬀ for FM for each possible material payoﬀ for SM. For fairness-kinked preferences, the
graph of –which I call the fairness rule–is the set of material payoﬀ pairs where the indif-
ference curves are kinked. Existing models with kinks embed the “equal-split rule” into prefer-
ences, defined by  (2) = 2. Generalizing  allows preferences to capture adherence to whatever
rule of fair behavior might be relevant to a particular setting.3 Using labels suitable for SM, let
 ≡ {(1 2) |1   (2)} denote the region of disadvantageously unfair transactions, where
FM’s material payoﬀ is higher and SM’s material payoﬀ is lower than dictated by the fairness rule;
and let  ≡ {(1 2) |1   (2)} denote the region of advantageously unfair transactions for
SM. Figure 1a illustrates these regions. (In all figures, I put 1 on the y-axis because in the simple
case in which FM is self-regarding, solving for equilibrium amounts to maximizing 1.)
Definition 1.  is fairness-kinked if (a)  (1 2) is twice-continuously diﬀerentiable except
along a fairness rule  ; (b) for all (1 2) ∈  , 2  0; and (c) for all (1 2) ∈  , 1  0.
For example, the piecewise-linear distributional preferences (1) are fairness-kinked if (a)  6= , (b)
  1, and (c)   0, as in both Fehr & Schmidt (1999) and Charness & Rabin (2002).
A second property, “normality,” can also capture a concern for fairness. In consumer theory, an
agent’s preferences have the “normal good” property with respect to a particular good if, for prices
held fixed, the agent chooses to consume more of that good when his income increases. Normality
can be defined analogously for distributional preferences, but in this context, the “goods” are the
material payoﬀs of the players. For some price   0 and income  ∈ R, define e1 (; ) ande2 (; ) by (e1 e2) = argmax{(12):1+2=}  (1 2). Assume that e1 (; ) and e2 (; ) are
finite, real-valued functions (which will be implied by the other assumptions on  , given below).
Definition 2. For  = 1 2,  is (weakly) locally normal in  at (; ) if e (; ) is (weakly)
increasing in  at (; ).  is (weakly) normal in  if  is (weakly) locally normal in  at
(; ) for all   0 and  ∈ R.  is (weakly) normal if  is (weakly) normal in both 1 and 2.
3While 50-50 splits often serve as a benchmark for what is fair in contexts where payoﬀs are monetary–such
as in negotiations, asymmetric joint ventures among corporations, share tenancy in agriculture, and bequests to
children (Andreoni & Bernheim 2009)–there are exceptions, e.g., financial contracts often apportion profit according
to unequal percentages that are standard in the industry. Moreover, in settings involving two commodities or a
commodity in exchange for money, the rate of pay that is considered fair is often determined by prevailing market
prices or recent experiences (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler 1986).
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Following Becker (1974), it is common in models of altruism to assume that distributional pref-
erences satisfy not only monotonicity but also normality. However, while monotonicity is intrinsic
to the notion of altruism, the connection between normality and altruism is questionable. Instead,
normality is more naturally interpreted as capturing a concern for fairness. It amounts to assuming
that FM’s material payoﬀ and SM’s material payoﬀ enter the utility function as complements.4
Normality is not assumed explicitly in existing fairness models, but it is a byproduct of most of the
specific functional forms that are adopted. While seemingly a natural assumption, it has strong
implications, as will be seen.
Turning to regularity conditions, a standard assumption about preferences is monotonicity:
utility is strictly increasing in each player’s material payoﬀ.
Definition 3.  is monotonic if  (1 2) is strictly increasing in both 1 and 2.
Monotonicity is the defining feature of altruism, and all models of altruism assume it.
Some models of distributional preferences aimed at capturing a concern for fairness also satisfy
monotonicity, such as Charness & Rabin’s (2002), but some do not (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt 1999;
Bolton & Ockenfels 2000). In particular, these latter models assume that people are “behindness
averse,” preferring to reduce the other player’s payoﬀ when that player’s payoﬀ is higher than their
own. For example, in the piecewise-linear model (1), behindness aversion corresponds to   0.
To allow for this kind of non-monotonicity, I define a weaker property that I call “joint-
monotonicity.”5
Definition 4.  is joint-monotonic if for any (1 2) and any   0, there is some (b1 b2)
such that 0  b1 − 1  , 0  b2 − 2  , and  (b1 b2)   (1 2).
The definition states that for any material payoﬀ pair, there is an arbitrarily close alternative
material payoﬀ pair giving more to both players that the agent strictly prefers. It implies local
non-satiation but additionally requires that it is possible to find a more-preferred allocation in
4To be precise, at any material payoﬀ pair where (12)1  0 and (12)2  0 , the statement about be-
havior “ is locally normal in ” is equivalent to the following statement about complementarity in preferences:


 
−

 0 (Quah, 2007, Theorem S1 and Proposition S1). The conditions (12)1  0 and (12)2  0
may not hold at every material payoﬀ pair when  is joint-monotonic (as defined below) and not monotonic. How-
ever, the analysis will show that normality is a relevant property for SM’s distributional preferences (not FM’s), and
Lemma 1 will establish that 2(12)1  0 and 2(12)2  0 hold at an optimum for SM.
5 In studying other-regarding preferences in a general equilibrium environment, Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirch-
steiger, Riedel, & Sobel (2011) independently propose a “social monotonicity” property, which is similar to my
joint-monotonicity property, except that it is a restriction on both players’ distributional preferences. I discuss the
relationship between social monotonicity and joint monotonicity in Appendix A.
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a particular direction, a direction which jointly increases both players’ material payoﬀs. The in-
terpersonal indiﬀerence curves depicted in Figures 1a and 1b represent distributional preferences
that violate monotonicity but satisfy joint-monotonicity. While ruling out pure spitefulness and
pure self-hating, joint-monotonicity allows for behindness aversion. More generally, it permits the
possibility that an agent might prefer to reduce either one or the other player’s material payoﬀ to
reach what the agent considers to be a fairer allocation.
In much of the analysis, I will assume that SM’s distributional preferences are joint-monotonic
but that FM either is purely self-regarding or has monotonic distributional preferences. Given
that some of the existing models allow for behindness aversion in order to describe behavior in
experiments, this assumption about FM might seem suspect. There are two distinct justifications
for it. First, while there is debate over whether behindness aversion should be assumed, most direct
evidence from experiments in fact indicates that most subjects’ distributional preferences satisfy
monotonicity.6 Advocates of behindness aversion primarily argue that it should be assumed because
it provides a tractable shortcut for capturing reciprocity-like behavior by a second mover (e.g.,
Fehr & Schmidt 2004, p.10; Fehr & Schmidt 2003), which is valuable because models of reciprocity
itself (e.g., Rabin 1993) are notoriously diﬃcult to work with. The assumption that FM has
monotonic preferences is compatible with this argument in favor of assuming that SM’s preferences
are joint-monotonic. Second, in an exchange situation in which FM is a profit-maximizing firm, it
is appropriate to assume that FM is purely self-regarding. In Web Appendix A, I discuss the more
complex case where FM is assumed to have merely joint-monotonic preferences.
The final property, quasi-concavity, is familiar from consumer theory and social choice.
Definition 5.  is quasi-concave if for any two distinct material payoﬀ pairs, (1 2) and
(b1 b2), such that  (1 2) ≤  (b1 b2),  (1 2)   (1 + (1− ) b1 2 + (1− ) b2) for
any  ∈ [0 1].  is weakly quasi-concave if the strict inequality is replaced by a weak inequality.
For distributional preferences, quasi-concavity means that along an interpersonal indiﬀerence curve,
6The debate has largely centered on the question of whether subjects care more about “eﬃciency” (in this context,
meaning the sum of monetary payoﬀs) or “equity” (meaning equality of monetary payoﬀs), and the experimental
findings are contradictory (e.g., Engelmann & Strobel 2004; Fehr, Naef, & Schmidt 2006). The question of whether
subjects’ distributional preferences are monotonic is related but distinct. Almost all of the experiments involving
simple allocation decisions by adult subjects find that most people do have monotonic distributional preferences
(Charness & Grosskopf 2001; Kritikos & Bolle 2001; Andreoni & Miller 2002; Charness & Rabin 2002; Fisman,
Kariv, & Markovits 2007; Cox & Sadiraj 2010). The exceptions in which a majority of subjects violate monotonicity
are: Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White (1992), who report evidence from hypothetical choices; Bolton & Ockenfels
(2006), from an experiment in which subjects vote over allocations; and Pelligra & Stanca (2013), from an Internet
survey where the dictator games have a small chance of being played out for real money.
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the higher FM’s material payoﬀ, the less of SM’s material payoﬀ the decision-maker is willing to give
up to increase FM’s material payoﬀ (and similarly with “FM” and “SM” switched). Equivalently,
it means that the upper level sets of  are convex. Every model of distributional preferences that
I am aware of satisfies quasi-concavity (e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000) or weak quasi-concavity
(e.g., Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Charness & Rabin 2002).7
While the above properties will be listed explicitly when assumed in the propositions, the
following two technical assumptions (TAs) will be maintained implicitly throughout. TA1 ensures
that the indiﬀerence curves (which are what matter for behavior) are kinked if and only if  is
kinked.8
TA1. At any point where  is diﬀerentiable,  has non-vanishing first derivative: there is no
(1 2) such that 1 = 2 = 0 at (1 2).
Whenever  is not purely self-regarding, I impose another technical assumption:
TA2. If  is not purely self-regarding, then there exist 1  0 and 2  0 such that
lim2→∞ sup∆1∆20
(12+∆2)−(12)∆2
(1+∆12)−(12)∆1
≤ 0, and either lim1→∞ inf∆1∆20
(12+∆2)−(12)∆2
(1+∆12)−(12)∆1
≤ 0 or =∞.
TA2 would be satisfied if, as in Example 1 in Section 2, lim2→∞
(12)2(12)1 = 0 (caring exclu-
sively about FM) and lim1→∞
(12)2(12)1 = ∞ (caring exclusively about SM), but TA2 also
allows either of these limits to be weakly negative (putting negative weight on the player with the
very high payoﬀ) and does not assume diﬀerentiability. For any given bilateral exchange game, 1
and 2 can be chosen to be small enough that TA2 has little economic content, but TA2 helps ensure
7The reason some models only satisfy weak quasi-concavity is that the utility function is assumed to be piecewise-
linear, as in (1). Since piecewise-linearity is clearly intended as a simplifying assumption and does not drive any
of the explanatory power of the models for laboratory behavior, adopting quasi-concave versions of these models is
consistent with their spirit. In the analysis, quasi-concavity serves mainly as a regularity condition to help ensure
uniqueness of optimal behavior.
8TA1 is needed because the assumptions are stated in terms of  (rather than made directly on the indiﬀerence
curves) and because monotonicity will be weakened. When  is monotonic, the interpersonal indiﬀerence curves are
kinked if and only if  is kinked. However, when  is joint-monotonic, there may be saddle points, (1 2) with

1 =

2 = 0, where the indiﬀerence curves can be kinked even though  is smooth. For example, the function
 ( ) =



3 + 3 if   0   0
3 if   0  ≤ 0
3 if  ≤ 0   0
3 + 3 if  ≤ 0  ≤ 0
is twice-continuously diﬀerentiable, but has a kinked indiﬀerence curve at  ( ) = 0 given by min { } = 0.
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the existence of optimal actions by helping to make the set of individually-rational transactions
compact.
Finally, I normalize the utility levels so that the outside option gives both players zero utility:
1 (0 0) = 2 (0 0) = 0. As a tie-breaker with the outside option, I assume that if an agent also
expects to get zero utility from trading, then the agent chooses to trade.
5 Reciprocity-Like Behavior in the Bilateral Exchange Game
In this section, partly to build intuition for the eﬃciency results and partly because it is of indepen-
dent interest, I show that normality and/or fairness-kinkedness are the properties of distributional-
preference that generate reciprocal behavior in bilateral exchange games. I will refer to such
behavior as “reciprocity-like” because it is not generated by true reciprocity as modeled, e.g., by
Rabin (1993). I define reciprocity-like behavior as follows: SM’s optimal response 2 (1) to FM’s
action 1 is an increasing function of 1.
For analyzing SM’s behavior here and in later sections, it will be useful to introduce notation and
terminology for a consumer-theory-like conceptualization of the bilateral exchange game. Denote
a material-payoﬀ “consumption bundle” as the vector −→ (1 2) ≡ (1 (1 2)  2 (1 2)). Given
FM’s action 1, SM’s choice of action 2 can be thought of as selecting a pair of material payoﬀs on
the (material payoﬀ) budget curve  (1) = {−→ (1 2)}2∈R. FM’s choice of 1 can be thought
of as a decision of which budget curve to oﬀer to SM. To facilitate the analogy with consumer theory,
it is useful to consider the budget line that locally approximates the budget curve. At a transaction
(1 2) that identifies a point (1 (1 2)  2 (1 2)) on the budget curve  (1), the equation for
the budget line is 1 + 2 = , where  =  (1 2) ≡ − 12
¯¯¯
(1)
is the local slope of the budget
curve–the price of 1 in terms of 2–and  =  (1 2) ≡ 1 (1 2) +  (1 2)2 (1 2) is
the corresponding level of “income” that would allow SM to just “aﬀord” the point on the budget
curve. Figure 2 depicts a budget curve and the approximating budget line at SM’s optimal action.
Finally, I refer to the transaction (b1 2 (b1)) as a fairness-rule optimum if SM’s distributional
preferences are fairness-kinked and his optimum occurs on the fairness rule: −→ (b1 2 (b1)) ∈
graph(). This occurs when
lim−→→−→ (12(1))−→ ∈
µ2 (−→ )
2 −  (b1 2 (b1)) 2 (
−→ )
1
¶
≥ 0
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and
lim−→→−→ (12(1))−→ ∈
µ2 (−→ )
2 −  (b1 2 (b1)) 2 (
−→ )
1
¶
≤ 0
where these inequalities describe the local slope of SM’s indiﬀerences curves in the regions of
disadvantageous and advantageous unfairness, respectively, relative to the price at (b1 2 (b1)). I
call the transaction a strict fairness-rule optimum if both of these inequalities are strict.
Under what conditions is SM’s behavior reciprocity-like? It is widely believed that behindness-
aversion is the property that enables the inequity-aversion model to generate such behavior. That
is indeed true in the much-studied ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze 1982), in
which a second mover can either accept or reject a first mover’s oﬀer of some division of $10. If the
second mover rejects, both players get $0. If the first mover’s oﬀer is $5/$5, then the second mover
will accept the oﬀer because it is just as fair as $0/$0 and gives him a higher payoﬀ. In contrast, if
the oﬀer would leave the second mover behind, then due to behindness aversion, the second mover
may prefer the equal outcome from rejecting, even though both players get a lower payoﬀ.
In bilateral exchange games (including the gift-exchange game and the trust game), however–
or more generally, any game where the budget curve is both downward-sloping and continuous–
behindness aversion does not generate reciprocity-like behavior. This follows from Lemma 1, which
shows that as long as SM’s distributional preferences are joint-monotonic, then even if they are not
monotonic, his behavior is indistinguishable from an agent whose preferences are monotonic.
Lemma 1. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. For any 1, SM has a unique
optimal best response, 2 (1), that is a continuous function of 1. Moreover, if 2 is continuously
diﬀerentiable at some (b1 2 (b1)), then 21  0 and 22  0 at (b1 2 (b1)).
The lemma states that even if SM’s distributional preferences are merely joint-monotonic, as long
as his optimum occurs on a smooth region of his indiﬀerence curves, his utility at his optimal
action will be increasing in both players’ material payoﬀs. Intuitively, SM cannot be optimizing if,
at his supposed optimum, he preferred to reduce one of the player’s payoﬀs; since the price of 1 in
terms of 2 is positive, he would be able to get higher utility by either increasing or reducing his
action. Graphically, Figure 2 illustrates that since the budget curve is always downward-sloping
in the space of material payoﬀs, the tangency point with the indiﬀerence curve must occur on a
downward-sloping region of the indiﬀerence curve.
Lemma 1 implies that the generalization from monotonicity to joint-monotonicity for SM is
irrelevant for his behavior in a neighborhood of his optimum–and therefore, peeking ahead a
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bit, for his behavior in a neighborhood of an equilibrium. Even if SM’s distributional preferences
are fairness-kinked, either his optimum occurs on a smooth region of his indiﬀerence curves, in
which case the result applies, or his optimum occurs at a kink, in which case the weakening of
monotonicity to joint-monotonicity does not matter because non-monotonicities away from the
kink are not relevant for behavior.9
Rather than behindness aversion, either normality or fairness-kinkedness is a property of dis-
tributional preferences that can generate reciprocity-like behavior in the bilateral exchange game,
as shown by Proposition 3.
Proposition 3.
1. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, and fairness-kinked. Suppose that (b1 2 (b1))
is a strict fairness-rule optimum. Then (1 2 (1)) is a strict fairness-rule optimum for all
1 in a neighborhood of b1, and 2 (1) is increasing in 1 at b1. Furthermore, 2 is locally
normal in 1 and 2 at ( (b1 2 (b1)) ;  (b1 2 (b1))).
2. Suppose 1
³12
22
´
≤ 0 and 2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. If 2 is weakly
locally normal at ( (b1 2 (b1)) ;  (b1 2 (b1))), then 2 (1) is increasing in 1 at b1. Hence
if 2 is weakly normal in 1, then 2 (1) is increasing in 1.
The first part considers a situation where SM’s preferences are fairness-kinked and FM’s behavior
induces a strict fairness-rule optimum. In that case, if FM slightly increases her action, thereby
slightly shifting and changing the slope of the budget curve, then SM’s new optimum will occur
at another fairness-rule optimum. Since the increase in FM’s action increases 2 but reduces 1,
SM must increase his action in order to keep the players’ material payoﬀs on the fairness rule. A
special case of this result has been proved previously for inequity aversion and particular material
payoﬀ functions (Fehr, Klein, & Schmidt 2007, p.147).
The first part of Proposition 3 also shows that, although distinct, fairness-kinkedness and nor-
mality are related: at a strict fairness-kinked optimum, 2 is locally normal. If the budget curve
shifts outward with the slope unchanged, SM’s new optimum will occur at another fairness-rule
optimum and hence both players’ material payoﬀs increase.
9 In the range of economic settings captured by the bilateral exchange game, Lemma 1 implies that if SM had the
option of “punishing” FM for taking a low action by choosing a material payoﬀ pair that is materially-dominated by
some point on the budget curve, then (unlike in the ultimatum game) he would never do it. Hence, if such behavior
were observed, it would be mistaken to attribute it to SM’s distributional preferences and instead should presumably
be attributed to negative reciprocity.
17
The second part of Proposition 3 states that when SM’s preferences are normal, a suﬃcient
condition for reciprocity-like behavior is 1
³12
22
´
≤ 0. This condition means that an increase
in FM’s action weakly lowers the price for SM of increasing FM’s payoﬀ. This assumption is satisfied
if, as in trust game experiments, both players’ material payoﬀ functions are additively-separable
in the actions.10 It is also satisfied by the material payoﬀ functions typically used in gift-exchange
game experiments, and indeed Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & Riedl (1998, pp.7-8) prove the result for this
case.11
The intuition for Part 2 of the proposition can be understood in terms of income and substitution
eﬀects on the material-payoﬀ “consumption bundle” that are induced by a small increase in FM’s
action. Since FM’s material payoﬀ becomes cheaper–due to the condition 1
³12
22
´
≤ 0–the
substitution eﬀect gives SM an incentive to increase 1 relative to 2, and therefore to increase
his action. If the income eﬀect is positive, then since SM’s distributional preferences are normal,
SM’s incentive to increase 1 is reinforced, and consequently SM prefers to increase his action. If
instead the income eﬀect is negative, then both the substitution eﬀect and income eﬀect give SM
an unambiguous incentive to decrease 2, which again makes him prefer to increase his action.12
6 Characterizing Eﬃcient Transactions
In this section I address what is meant by an “eﬃcient” transaction when agents have distributional
preferences. There are two possible generalizations of Pareto eﬃciency, depending on whether the
players’ welfare is measured by material payoﬀs or by utilities:
Definition 6. A transaction (1 2) is utility Pareto eﬃcient (UPE) if there is no other trans-
action (b1b2) such that 1 (−→ (b1b2)) ≥ 1 (−→ (1 2)) and 2 (−→ (b1b2)) ≥ 2 (−→ (1 2)), at
least one inequality strict.
Definition 7. A transaction (1 2) is materially Pareto eﬃcient (MPE) if there is no
other transaction (b1b2) such that 1 (b1b2) ≥ 1 (1 2) and 2 (b1b2) ≥ 2 (1 2), at least
one inequality strict.
10More generally than additive-separability, the assumption is satisfied if the actions enter the material payoﬀ
functions as complements in the sense that the transformed material payoﬀ functions, 1 (1 2) and 2 (1 2),
defined by 1 (1 2) ≡ 1 (−1 2) and 2 (1 2) ≡ 1 (1−2), are both weakly supermodular in (1 2).
11Specifically, following Fehr, Kirchsteiger, & Riedl (1993), in order to rule out negative payoﬀ values, gift-exchange
experiments typically use as material payoﬀ functions: 1 (1 2) = (1 − 1) 2 and 2 (1 2) = 1 −  (2) − 2,
where  (·) is increasing and strictly convex, 1  0 and 2 are constants, and 1 ≤ 1 and 2 ≥ 0 have restricted
domain.
12 In terms of the notation defined in Section 6, the income eﬀect is positive when the small increase in FM’s action
occurs from a level below 1, and the income eﬀect is negative when FM’s initial action is above 1.
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If a transaction (1 2) is MPE, then I will also refer to the resulting material payoﬀ pair −→ (1 2)
as MPE; analogously for UPE. A transaction is MPE if and only if at that transaction, the material-
payoﬀ marginal rates of substitution are equal: 1(12)11(12)2 = 2(12)12(12)2 . In general, the level
of 1 that corresponds to an MPE transaction depends on 2. By discussing Pareto eﬃciency
exclusively in terms of monetary payoﬀs, analyses of laboratory experiment have implicitly focused
on MPE.
Which generalization of Pareto eﬃciency is the right social welfare criterion? If the  ’s represent
the players’ “true” preferences, then UPE is appropriate. However, if fair-minded behavior is caused
by (unmodeled) social pressure and the  ’s are a reduced-form representation of the resulting
behavior, then the ’s may actually represent the players’ “true” preferences. In that case, MPE
is the appropriate welfare criterion.13
To characterize MPE and UPE and their relationship to each other, a few definitions will be
useful. Let
(1 2) ≡ arg max
(12)
1 (−→ (1 2))
be called FM’s favorite transaction, her most-preferred transaction among the feasible trans-
actions. I will sometimes also call the resulting material payoﬀ pair, (1 2) ≡ −→ (1 2), FM’s
favorite transaction. Let ¡1 2¢ ≡ arg max
(12)
2 (−→ (1 2))
be called SM’s favorite transaction, his most-preferred transaction among the feasible trans-
actions, with corresponding material payoﬀ pair ¡1 2¢. Theorem 1 describes the relationship
between MPE and UPE when FM has monotonic distributional preferences (see Web Appendix A
for the more general case where FM’s preferences are joint-monotonic).14
Theorem 1. Suppose 1 is monotonic and quasi-concave, and suppose 2 is joint-monotonic and
quasi-concave. FM’s and SM’s favorite transactions, (1 2) and ¡1 2¢, exist and are unique.
The set of UPE material payoﬀ pairs coincides exactly with the set of material payoﬀ pairs on the
MPE frontier between (1 2) and ¡1 2¢.
13Sen (1973) and Köszegi & Rabin (2008) similarly argue that in some situations, behavior–as represented by
the  ’s–may not be the correct basis for judging welfare. For example, Sen (1973, pp.253-254) writes: “mores and
rules of behaviour drive a wedge between behaviour and welfare...basing normative criteria, e.g., Pareto optimality,
on [behaviour-derived] as if preferences poses immense diﬃculties.”
14Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel, & Sobel (2011) independently prove a result related to Theorem
1; their Theorem 3 implies that when at least one player has monotonic distributional preferences, material Pareto
eﬃciency is a necessary condition for utility Pareto eﬃciency. I discuss the relationship between Theorem 1 and their
result in more detail in Web Appendix A.
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Figure 3 illustrates that the set of UPE material payoﬀ pairs is the subset of the MPE frontier
between (1 2) and ¡1 2¢. (The figure is drawn with 1  1 and 2  2, but the theorem
also holds if these inequalities are reversed.) To understand why the theorem is true, first note
that any UPE material payoﬀ pair must be MPE: for any non-MPE material payoﬀ pair, there
is an alternative material payoﬀ pair that gives more to both players that SM prefers because his
preferences are joint-monotonic, and FM prefers because her preferences are monotonic. Next, note
that for any two material payoﬀ pairs on the MPE frontier, each player prefers the pair closer to
his favorite transaction. Therefore, a pair on the frontier that gives higher material payoﬀ to FM
than 1 cannot be UPE because both players prefer (1 2). Similarly, a pair on the frontier that
gives higher material payoﬀ to SM than 2 cannot be UPE because both players prefer ¡1 2¢.15
While there are many MPE transactions, Lemma 2 shows a surprising result: in the bilateral
exchange game, SM’s favorite transaction is the only MPE transaction that is possible for FM to
induce! As above, let 2 (1) denote SM’s best-response function.
Lemma 2. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. Then there exists a unique b1 such
that the resulting transaction (b1 2 (b1)) is MPE. This transaction is SM’s favorite transaction¡1 2¢, and it is UPE.
To understand Lemma 2, note that at any MPE material payoﬀ pair where SM’s action is a best
response, SM’s indiﬀerence curve must be tangent to the MPE frontier (as shown in Figure 4).
Such a tangency point must be SM’s favorite transaction. Given this result, I will hereafter refer
to SM’s favorite transaction as “the” eﬃcient transaction.
7 Necessary Conditions for An Eﬃcient Equilibrium
This section describes necessary conditions for the eﬃcient transaction to be the equilibrium of the
bilateral exchange game. The main result will be that there are essentially only two cases: one
involving SM’s action being a locally linear transfer of material payoﬀs, and the other involving
SM’s distributional preferences being fairness-kinked.
As an initial step, Lemma 3 establishes that under the maintained assumptions TA1 and TA2,
an equilibrium of the game exists.
15 If one or both of the players is purely self-regarding, then Theorem 1 does not technically apply but extends
straightforwardly: The set of UPE material payoﬀ pairs remains coincident with the set of material payoﬀ pairs on
the MPE frontier between (1 2) and 1 2, but depending on which player is purely self-regarding, (1 2) ≡
(∞−∞), 1 2 ≡ (−∞∞), or both.
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Lemma 3. An equilibrium exists. Moreover, if 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0, then an equilibrium exists in
which the players exchange rather than taking their outside options.
The equilibrium will involve FM choosing her outside option if SM’s optimal response to every
possible 1 resulted in negative utility for FM. Lemma 3 states that a suﬃcient condition for trade
to occur in equilibrium is that FM prefers SM’s favorite transaction to her own outside option:
1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0. This condition is suﬃcient because, from Lemma 2, there exists an action for FM
that induces SM’s favorite transaction.
As another preliminary step, Proposition 4 states formally a corollary of Lemma 2: SM’s favorite
transaction is the only candidate for an equilibrium that is MPE.
Proposition 4. Suppose 1 and 2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. If the equilibrium
(1 2 (1)) is MPE, then (1 2 (1)) is SM’s favorite transaction, and 1 (−→ (1 2 (1))) ≥ 0.
Proposition 4 additionally states that, besides being a suﬃcient condition for trade to occur,
1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0 is also a necessary condition for the equilibrium to be MPE.
If FM is self-regarding, then the condition 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0 has a straightforward interpretation:
SM’s distributional preferences involve suﬃcient positive regard for FM that SM’s favorite trans-
action is better for FM than not trading. If instead SM were too selfish, then 1 would be so small
that FM would prefer her outside option to
¡1 2¢. Later, when providing suﬃcient conditions
for an eﬃcient equilibrium, 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0, as well as the other necessary conditions, will be main-
tained assumptions. Although 1 ¡1 2¢ ≥ 0 is not an assumption directly on primitives, it is
a straightforward condition to check once the players’ material payoﬀ functions and distributional
preferences have been specified.
Theorem 2 is a central result of this paper. It states that a necessary condition for the equilib-
rium to be eﬃcient is that at least one of three possibilities must be true.
Theorem 2. Suppose 1 and 2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave, and 2 is either twice-
continuously diﬀerentiable or fairness-kinked. If the equilibrium (1 2 (1)) is MPE, then at least
one of the following must be true:
1. (1 2 (1)) is FM’s favorite transaction.
2. (12(1))1 = 0.
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3. 2 is fairness-kinked, and (1 2 (1)) is a fairness-rule optimum.
Possibility (1) (the least interesting) is that FM and SM share the same favorite transaction. That
transaction would then be the equilibrium, and it would be eﬃcient. Possibility (2) is that FM’s
action does not aﬀect the slope of the budget curve at the equilibrium transaction. Possibility (3)
is that SM’s indiﬀerence curve is fairness-kinked at the equilibrium transaction.
Once possibility (1) is excluded, to understand why possibilities (2) and (3) are the only sit-
uations where the equilibrium could be MPE, consider a deviation by FM from her equilibrium
action to some alternative action. Figure 4 illustrates, but instead of showing the budget curves
that SM actually faces at the original, equilibrium material-payoﬀ pair and the new point, it shows
the budget lines that approximate the budget curves.
SM’s response to the change in the budget line can be characterized by the Slutsky decompo-
sition into an income eﬀect and a substitution eﬀect. The magnitude of the income eﬀect depends
on how much the budget line shifts due to the change in FM’s action, holding constant the original,
equilibrium price. Since the original budget line is tangent to the MPE frontier, FM’s original action
is the action that maximizes income at the original price; hence if FM’s deviation is small, then by
the envelope theorem, the income eﬀect is second order.
Since the income eﬀect is second order, the substitution eﬀect must equal zero. Otherwise, by
marginally deviating from the equilibrium action, FM could cause SM to choose a material payoﬀ
pair that either–depending on the direction FM chooses to deviate–gives FM a higher material
payoﬀ and SM a lower material payoﬀ than at the original material payoﬀ pair, or vice-versa. Since
FM’s favorite transaction does not coincide with SM’s favorite transaction, FM would prefer one of
these over the original material payoﬀ pair, violating the assumption that the original action was
an equilibrium.
Possibilities (2) and (3) correspond to the two possible ways that the substitution eﬀect can
equal zero. The budget lines may locally be parallel shifts, in which case there is no change in
relative price; that is (2). Alternatively, the optimal material payoﬀ pair may occur at a kink in
SM’s indiﬀerence curves, in which case SM’s optimal pair does not change in response to a Slutsky-
compensated change in price; because any kink must be on the fairness rule by assumption, that
situation is (3).
I have stated possibility (2) as (12(1))1 = 0 in order to make transparent its link to the
intuition that the substitution eﬀect is zero. Yet, as stated, it raises the question: for what material
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payoﬀ functions is it satisfied? In a paper about the special case of the rotten kid theorem, Dijkstra
(2007, his Lemma 1) answered this question: (12(1))1 = 0 at SM’s favorite transaction if and
only if the material payoﬀ functions are locally conditionally transferable at SM’s favorite
transaction, i.e., in a neighborhood of
¡1 2¢, 1(12)22(12)2 = − for some constant   0.16
The fact that possibility (2) corresponds to locally parallel shifts of the budget curves makes
clear why normality of SM’s distributional preferences will play an important role. In fact, under
possibility (2), if FM is purely self-regarding, local normality of 2 in 1 at SM’s favorite transaction
is another necessary condition for the equilibrium to be MPE.
8 Suﬃcient Conditions for An Eﬃcient Equilibrium
The previous section showed that there are exactly two interesting cases in which the equilibrium
could be eﬃcient: (1) the budget lines that approximate the budget curves are parallel shifts, or
(2) SM’s interpersonal indiﬀerence curve is kinked at the equilibrium. This section explores these
cases in more detail, giving suﬃcient conditions for the equilibrium to be eﬃcient in each case.
The intuition in both cases is fundamentally the same: SM’s behavior aligns the players’ material
incentives by ensuring that the players’ material payoﬀs increase or decrease together as FM varies
her action. FM will choose the action that maximizes both players’ material payoﬀs if FM’s
distributional preferences are monotonic, leading to an eﬃcient equilibrium.
8.1 Eﬃcient Case I: Budget Curves Are Parallel Shifts
As discussed in Section 7, the budget curves are parallel shifts locally if and only if the material
payoﬀ functions are locally conditionally transferable. In that case, as long as 2 is locally normal,
both players’ material payoﬀs increase or decrease together as FM varies her action. If these
conditions hold in a neighborhood of the eﬃcient transaction, then the action that generates the
eﬃcient outcome will be a local optimum for FM. Global analogs of the local assumptions ensure
that the players’ material incentives are aligned over the entire range of FM’s possible actions.
16 In an influential paper, Bergstrom (1989) argued but did not prove that global conditional transferability, as
defined in Section 8, is necessary for possibility (2). Dijkstra’s (2007) result shows that that conjecture was incorrect.
Dijkstra’s “Condition 2” characterizes exactly the class of material payoﬀ functions that is locally conditionally
transferable at
1 2, but the condition is diﬃcult to interpret. Here I provide an intuitive example of material
payoﬀ functions that are not globally conditionally transferable but that are locally conditionally transferable at1 2. Consider 1 (1 2) =  (1 2) and 2 (1 2) =  (1)− ( (1 2)), where  0  0 and  00 6= 0. These
material payoﬀ functions could describe a setting where an investor (FM) invests an amount of money 1 and pays
a trustee (SM) an amount  (1) to oversee the investment, and then the trustee allocates the accumulated capital
between the investor and himself by choice of 2.
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The natural condition to guarantee that the budget curves facing SM are parallel shifts every-
where is that the material payoﬀ functions are globally conditionally transferable: for some
functions , , and  and constant   0, 1 (1 2) = − (1) +  (1 2) and 2 (1 2) =
 (1)−  (1 2). If so, and if FM is purely self-regarding or has monotonic distributional pref-
erences, then (global) normality of 2 is suﬃcient to ensure that the equilibrium is unique and
occurs at the eﬃcient transaction.17
Theorem 3. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, and normal. Suppose the material
payoﬀ functions are globally conditionally transferable. If 1 is monotonic or purely self-regarding,
and if 1 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ ≥ 0, then the unique equilibrium transaction is the eﬃcient transaction¡1 2¢.
Figure 5 illustrates Theorem 3.
For fixed material payoﬀ functions, as long as the specified assumptions of the theorem hold,
the conclusion does not depend on exactly how selfish or altruistic SM is, or whether 2 is kinked or
smooth; FM will choose the same action in any case, since with globally conditionally transferable
material payoﬀs, there is a unique eﬃcient 1 such that the budget curve coincides with the MPE
frontier. Thus, loosely speaking (since there is no uncertainty in the model), as Becker (1974) notes
in the context of the rotten kid theorem, FM would choose the eﬃcient action even if she were
uncertain about SM’s distributional preferences and hence uncertain about exactly which action
SM will choose.
A special class of material payoﬀ functions that satisfies global conditional transferability is
quasi-linearity in 2: 1 (1 2) = − (1) + 2 and 2 (1 2) =  (1) − 2 (as in Example 1
from Section 2). These material payoﬀ functions are often used to model situations where SM’s
action is a monetary transfer. This would describe settings where FM is a seller who provides a
service, and SM is a (fair-minded) customer who decides how much to pay for the service. Quasi-
linearity in 2 would not describe environments where FM’s action is a transfer of money to SM,
such as when FM is a profit-maximizing employer who pays a wage, and SM is a (fair-minded)
worker who exerts eﬀort. Therefore, Theorem 3 could apply in the former case but not the latter.
17 If FM is purely self-regarding, the assumption of normality of 2 can be weakened to normality of 2 in 1.
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8.2 Eﬃcient Case II: SM’s Distributional Preferences Are Fairness-Kinked
The logic for how fairness-kinked distributional preferences can lead to an eﬃcient equilibrium
requires that the eﬃcient transaction be a strict fairness-rule optimum. In that case, as shown in
Proposition 3, SM behaves in accordance with the fairness rule for any small change in FM’s action.
As long as FM is self-regarding or has monotonic distributional preferences, this condition ensures
that the eﬃcient transaction is a local optimum for both players.
To ensure that the eﬃcient outcome is the equilibrium, a natural approach would be to write
down suﬃcient conditions for SM’s optimum to occur on the fairness rule for any action by FM.
Unfortunately, such conditions would probably have to be quite strong. For example, if there are
no restrictions on the shape of the budget curves, then in order to ensure that SM’s optimum occurs
at a kink, both the advantageously unfair and disadvantageously unfair portions of his indiﬀerence
curves would have to be upward-sloping. This would mean that SM cares so much about fairness
that, starting from any fair transaction, he would never prefer to increase just one player’s material
payoﬀ.
Instead, I seek suﬃcient conditions that are not implausibly restrictive and relatively straight-
forward to check. Analogous to the    assumption in Example 2 from Section 2, the idea of
the suﬃcient conditions is to ensure that SM is not so generous in the region of disadvantagenous
inequality that FM can earn higher utility by deviating to a low action. With piecewise-linear dis-
tributional preferences for SM and with a purely self-regarding FM, making the single parameter
 suﬃciently small suﬃced. Here, several assumptions are needed to do the same job.
Let (b1b2) denote the (unique) transaction satisfying 1(b1b2) = 1 ¡1 2¢, 2 (−→ (b1b2)) =
0, and b1  1. That is, b1 is the smallest action that keeps SM from taking his outside option and
that could possibly give FM a material payoﬀ of at least 1 ¡1 2¢. I assume:
S1. SM’s distributional preferences are “suﬃciently kinked” at the eﬃcient transaction:
lim−→→−→ (12)−→ ∈
µ
2(−→ )
2 − (1b2)2(−→ )1 ¶  0.
S2. 1 (1 2) and 2 (1 2) are each additively separable in the actions.
S3. 2 is normal.
S4. FM gets higher material payoﬀ from her own favorite transaction than from SM’s favorite
transaction: 1 (1 2)  1 ¡1 2¢.
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S5. 1 is weakly quasi-concave.
S1 means that if FM chose b1, SM’s optimal response would give FM a lower material payoﬀ than
1 ¡1 2¢. Combined with S2 and S3, it implies that FM would also earn a lower material payoﬀ
than 1 ¡1 2¢ for any action between b1 and 1. Specifically, as FM’s action increases, S2 implies
that the cost (in units of 2) to SM of choosing an action that yields 1 ¡1 2¢ is rising, and
S3 ensures that SM’s willingness to pay for 1 is falling.18 If FM is purely self-regarding, then
S1-S3 are suﬃcient to ensure that 1 is FM’s global optimum. If FM has monotonic distributional
preferences, however, then it is possible that FM could prefer to deviate to an action that gives her
a lower material payoﬀ. S4 and S5 are realistic assumptions that together rule out that possibility.
Theorem 4. Suppose 2 is joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, and fairness-kinked. Assume S1-S5.
If 1 is monotonic or purely self-regarding, if ¡1 2¢ is a strict fairness-rule optimum, and if
1 ¡−→ ¡1 2¢¢ ≥ 0, then the unique equilibrium transaction is the eﬃcient transaction ¡1 2¢.
I emphasize that while S3 imposes normality, its role in Theorem 4 is to help rule out that other
actions give FM a higher material payoﬀ than 1; normality is not required for the fundamental
logic, described at the beginning of this subsection, for how SM behaving in accordance with a
fairness rule aligns the players’ material incentives. Figure 6a illustrates the eﬃcient equilibrium
when SM has fairness-kinked distributional preferences, and Figure 6b shows a way the equilibrium
could fail to be eﬃcient if the assumptions of Theorem 4 are not satisfied.
Unlike Theorem 3, Theorem 4 does not require the material payoﬀ functions to be locally
conditionally transferable and so applies to non-monetary trades, such as barter or exchange of
favors. Moreover, as long as SM adheres to some fairness rule, the equilibrium will be eﬃcient,
even if the fairness rule is non-linear or self-serving.
I suggested above that Theorem 3 would hold even if FM were uncertain about exactly what
SM’s distributional preferences are. Theorem 4, in contrast, requires that FM know what fairness
rule SM is following. Otherwise, FM would not know which action would induce SM’s favorite
transaction. Therefore, loosely speaking, there is “social value” in having SM’s fairness rule be
common knowledge. Social norms like 50-50 splits or other fairness conventions may serve the
function of being fairness rules that are common knowledge.
18While S3 is exactly what is needed to ensure that SM’s willingness to pay for 1 is falling (see footnote 4), S2
seems stronger than what is required, but I do not know if a less restrictive assumption will suﬃce.
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9 Discussion
This paper gives conditions under which distributional preferences alone give rise to eﬃcient ex-
change. However, in one-shot interactions, eﬃcient exchange is usually thought to be enabled by
contracts. Therefore, the results in this paper raise the question: why do people so often write
contracts? I conclude by briefly discussing four answers that may be fruitful avenues for research.
One answer suggested from within the logic of the model is that FM prefers a contract, even
when the equilibrium of the bilateral exchange game would be eﬃcient. Suppose a contract im-
plements the Nash bargaining solution. It will select a UPE transaction that is in between FM’s
favorite transaction and SM’s favorite transaction, depending on the agents’ relative bargaining
power. At any of these transactions, FM gets higher utility than she does at SM’s favorite trans-
action. Therefore, FM would always be better oﬀ with a contract rather than relying on SM’s
distributional preferences, as long as writing and enforcing a contract is not too costly.
A second answer may be that FM is uncertain about SM’s distributional preferences. Indeed,
Fehr & Schmidt (1999) argue that heterogeneity in distributional preferences and the resulting
asymmetric information helps explain behavior in experiments. However, as noted in the discussions
after Theorems 3 and 4, FM’s uncertainty regarding some features of SM’s preferences do not
matter for FM’s action and the eﬃciency of equilibrium. Nonetheless, the overall degree of SM’s
non-selfishness can matter; recall that SM’s favorite transaction being suﬃciently generous was a
maintained assumption in the analysis (see the discussions following Lemma 3 and Proposition 4).
The asymmetric-information game cannot be analyzed in full generality without assumptions
about distributional preferences under uncertainty. The essential logic for how uncertainty regard-
ing selfishness may reduce eﬃciency, however, can be seen in a simple example. As in Example 2
in Section 2, suppose that 1 (1 2) = 2 − 1 and 2 (1 2) = 1 −  (2). Now suppose FM
is a risk-neutral, profit-maximizing firm; and SM is purely self-regarding with probability 1 − ,
and behaves in accordance with the equal-split fairness rule with probability : choosing 2 (1)
to satisfy 1 (1 2) = 2 (1 2). Assume that 2 ∈ [0∞) so that if SM is self-regarding, then
2 (1) ≡ 0. In equilibrium, FM’s first-order condition solves 0 (2 (1)) = 2− 1. Thus, if   1,
SM’s equilibrium action falls short of the eﬃcient level. Intuitively, by choosing a lower level of
1, FM can get some of the gains from trade when SM turns out to be fair-minded while insuring
against losing too much if SM turns out to be self-regarding.
A third possible reason to write contracts (instead of relying on distributional preferences to
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generate eﬃciency) is that more complex mechanisms of other-regarding behavior that are left out
of the model–such as signaling (e.g., Andreoni & Bernheim 2009) and intentions-based reciprocity
(e.g., Rabin 1993)–might cause the eﬃciency predictions to break down. For example, Netzer &
Schmutzler (2013) study a bilateral exchange game in which FM is purely self-regarding, and SM
puts positive weight on FM’s material payoﬀ only to the extent he believes FM has behaved kindly
toward him. They argue that when FM is purely self-regarding and SM’s behavior is driven by
such intentions-based reciprocity, the equilibrium is generically materially Pareto ineﬃcient because
SM is unwilling to reciprocate high actions by FM, which are interpreted as attempts at material-
payoﬀmaximization rather than as kindness. It is unclear whether this conclusion would hold in the
more general case where intentions-based reciprocity operates in combination with distributional
preferences, as in Falk & Fischbacher (2006).19
A fourth answer is that key assumptions underlying the eﬃciency results may be faulty. One
such assumption is that distributional preferences are defined over material payoﬀs (rather than,
say, separately over monetary payoﬀs and non-monetary payoﬀs). The combination of this as-
sumption with the assumption of either normality or fairness-kinkedness has an implication that
fundamentally underlies the eﬃciency results: SM’s strategy ensures that FM’s material payoﬀ net
of the cost incurred by her choosing a higher action is increasing in the eﬃciency of the action.
This implication has major ramifications even beyond those that I have focused on. For example,
it means that distributional preferences alone can completely solve the hold-up problem! When
both players are purely self-regarding, the hold-up problem arises when FM and SM bargain over
surplus after FM has already incurred the sunk cost of investing to generate the surplus, and thus
FM is forced to share the gross returns with SM. Anticipating this, it may not be profitable for
FM to make a socially eﬃcient investment. However, if FM and SM share the net returns due to
SM’s reciprocity-like behavior, then the hold-up problem disappears.
To assess how well these assumptions–distributional preferences defined over material payoﬀs,
normality, and fairness-kinkedness–approximate reality, each should be tested empirically. Their
implication–that FM’s material payoﬀ is increasing in net returns–can also be examined empiri-
cally because it means that SM’s action will depend not only on the benefit that SM receives from
FM’s action but also on the cost incurred by FM. Consider two situations. In both, FM provides
19Moreover, Charness & Rabin (2002) argue that intentions-based reciprocity becomes operative only in response
to a first-mover’s unkind behavior, while distributional preferences alone govern a second-mover’s behavior when FM
has behaved kindly. If so, then the analysis in this paper applies without modification to bilateral exchange settings
where both parties are gaining from the transaction because the intentions-based reciprocity is never activated.
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a service where higher quality requires higher eﬀort, and then SM chooses how much to tip. In
the second situation, it is more costly for FM to provide any given level of eﬀort, but the two
situations are otherwise identical, with the same eﬃcient level of eﬀort and resulting quality. A
testable prediction of the model is that SM would tip more in the second situation. An alternative
hypothesis, which also seems natural, is that SM’s tip depends only on the quality of service, and
so SM would tip the same amount in both situations. I am not aware of existing evidence that
tests these conflicting hypotheses.
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Web Appendix A: Neither Players Distribu-
tional Preferences Are Monotonic
(Not for publication)
In this appendix, I discuss how the conclusions of the analysis are a¤ected if both FMs and
SMs distributional preferences are joint-monotonic but not necessarily monotonic.
Theorem 1 in the main text shows that if one players distributional preferences are joint-
monotonic and the other players are monotonic, then the set of UPE material payo¤ pairs is a
subset of the set of MPE material payo¤ pairs. Theorem A1 generalizes to the case where both
playersdistributional preferences are joint-monotonic. In that case, there are UPE material payo¤
pairs that are not MPE. To state the result, let the interpersonal indi¤erence curve of FM that
goes through SMs favorite transaction
 
1; 2

be denoted IC1, and let the indi¤erence curve of
SM that goes through FMs favorite transaction (1; 2) be denoted IC2.
Theorem A1. Suppose U1 and U2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. FMs and SMs
favorite transactions, (a1; a2) and
 
a1; a2

, exist and are unique. The set of UPE material payo¤
pairs is a connected set that includes (1; 2) and
 
1; 2

and lies within the region enclosed by
IC1, IC2, and the MPE frontier.
Figure A1 illustrates the relationship between the set of MPE material payo¤ pairs and the set of
UPE material payo¤pairs in the case where neither player has monotonic distributional preferences.
The set of UPE material payo¤ pairs lies within the region enclosed by IC1, IC2, and the MPE
frontier because both players prefer any material payo¤ within that region to any feasible material
payo¤ pair outside that region. A material payo¤ pair that is UPE either occurs at a tangency
point between the playersindi¤erence curves at a point where both indi¤erence curves are upward
sloping (as shown in the gure) or it occurs on the MPE frontier if the relevant tangency lies
outside the set of feasible material-payo¤ pairs.
Theorem A1 specializes to Theorem 1 when at least one player has monotonic distributional
preferences. In that case, graphically, there cannot be a tangency between the playersindi¤erence
curves because the indi¤erence curves of the player with monotonic distributional preferences are
everywhere downward sloping.
Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirchsteiger, Riedel, & Sobel (2011) independently prove a di¤erent
result that is also more general than Theorem 1. They assume that the agents distributional
preferences satisfy a condition they call social monotonicity,which can be dened as follows:
Denition A1. U1 and U2 are social-monotonic if for any (1; 2) and any " > 0, there
is some (b1; b2) such that 0 < b1   1 < ", 0 < b2   2 < ", U1 (b1; b2) > U1 (1; 2), and
U2 (b1; b2) > U2 (1; 2).
The denition di¤ers from joint monotonicity because it requires that for any material payo¤ pair,
there is an arbitrarily close alternative material payo¤ pair giving more to both players that both
agents strictly prefer. If the players preferences satisfy social monotonicity, then both players
preferences are joint-monotonic, but both playerspreferences can be joint-monotonic without sat-
isfying social monotonicity. (In comparing social monotonicity with joint monotonicity, Dufwenberg
et al mis-state the denition of joint monotonicity to be essentially the same as my statement of
social monotonicity.)
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Under the same conditions as Theorem 1, except that the playersdistributional preferences
are assumed to be socially monotonic, Dufwenberg et al prove that the set of UPE material payo¤
pairs is a subset of the set of MPE material payo¤ pairs. Their result is more general than Theo-
rem 1 because if one players distributional preferences are joint-monotonic and the other players
distributional preferences are monotonic, then the playerspreferences satisfy social monotonicity.
We now turn from discussing which material payo¤ pairs are e¢ cient to discussing whether the
equilibrium is e¢ cient. Theorem 2 in the main text gives necessary conditions for the equilibrium
to be MPE. That theorem applies directly when both playerspreferences are joint-monotonic. As
discussed above, however, when both playerspreferences are joint-monotonic, there may be UPE
transactions that are not MPE. Theorem A2 presents necessary conditions for the equilibrium to
be UPE. If the equilibrium is MPE, then it is also UPE, but there are also other cases where the
equilibrium is UPE but not MPE.
Theorem A2. Suppose U1 and U2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave, and both are either
twice-continuously di¤erentiable or fairness-kinked. If the equilibrium (a1; a2 (a1)) is UPE and not
MPE, then (a1; a2 (a1)) is a fairness-rule optimum for SM. If, in addition, (a1; a2 (a1)) is a strict
fairness-rule optimum for SM and any fairness rule is continuously di¤erentiable, then at least one
of the following must be true:
1. SMs indi¤erence curve for disadvantageously unfair transactions is tangent to SMs fairness
rule at  ! (a1; a2 (a1)).
2. U1 is fairness-kinked,
 ! (a1; a2 (a1)) is on FMs fairness rule, and the respective fairness rules
f1 and f2 have di¤erent slopes at
 ! (a1; a2 (a1)).
Figure A2a illustrates the Case 2 listed in the theorem, which can be interpreted as a setting where
the two agents have di¤erent, self-serving ideas about what is fair. However, Figure A2b shows
that even if the equilibrium occurs on both playersfairness rules, the equilibrium is not necessarily
UPE. A corollary of Theorem A2 is that if both players interpersonal indi¤erence curves are
smooth thereby ruling out fairness-kinkedness then the equilibrium is UPE if and only if it is
MPE.
Theorems 3 and 4 provide su¢ cient conditions for the equilibrium to be MPE and UPE, but
they assume that FMs preferences are purely self-regarding or monotonic. If FMs preferences are
required only to be joint-monotonic, then the conclusions of the theorems may not hold. Even
though SMs behavior aligns the material incentives of the two players, if FMs preferences are
non-monotonic, then she may prefer not to maximize the playersmaterial payo¤s. For the case of
preferences that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3 except that FMs distributional preferences
are merely joint-monotonic Figure A3 illustrates an equilibrium that is neither MPE nor UPE.
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Web Appendix B: Proofs
(Not for publication)
Before proving the results in the text, we establish a technical lemma.
Technical Lemma. Suppose U1 and U2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. Then:
1. The set of individually-rational transactions
T  f(a1; a2) j U1( ! (a1; a2))  0; U2( ! (a1; a2))  0g
is non-empty and compact, as is the set of payo¤ pairs T  f ! (a1; a2) j (a1; a2) 2 Tg.
2. Along any graph of the form (g (2) ; 2), where g is a continuous, decreasing, weakly concave
function, Ui has a unique maximum 2 and strictly decreases as 2 moves away from this
maximum, for i = 1; 2. Moreover, the MPE frontier and each budget curve B (a1) is such a
graph.
Proof of part 1: The transaction (a1; a2) = (0; 0) gives material payo¤s  ! (0; 0) = (0; 0)
and utilities U1 (
 ! (0; 0)) = U2 ( ! (0; 0)) = 0, so both sets are non-empty. By TA2, T necessarily
lies to the north and east (respectively) of two lines 1 = 1  1 and 2 = 2  2, i.e.,
T  f(a1; a2) j 1(a1; a2)  1; 2(a1; a2)  2g. Hence T is closed and bounded and therefore
compact. It follows from A4 that T is also closed and bounded and therefore compact.
Proof of part 2: WLOG, consider U2. We rst show that for any real number k, the set
f2 j U2 (g (2) ; 2)  kg is an interval (possibly unbounded). Let 02 < 002 be two values in this
set. By construction, U2  k at (g (02) ; 02) and (g (002) ; 002). It follows that U2  k at (g (02) ; 002).
(To see this, let y = maxfy 2 [g (002) ; g (02)] j U2(y; 002)  kg (the maximum exists by continuity).
If y = g (02) then we are done, so assume y < g (02). By joint-monotonicity, we can choose y^; x^
with y < y^ < g (02) and x^ > 002 so that U2(y^; x^) > U2(y; 002)  k. The line segment connecting
(g (02) ; 02) and (y^; x^) meets the line x = 002 at a point with some y-coordinate strictly between y
and g (02). By quasi-concavity, the value of U2 at this point is  k. This contradicts the maximality
of y.) Now, for any 02 < 2 < 002, the point (g (2) ; 2) lies weakly inside the triangle dened by
these three points since g is weakly concave. Since U2 is quasi-concave, U2(g (2) ; 2)  k also.
This shows that there cannot be three values 02 < 2 < 002 with U2(g (02) ; 02) > U2(g (2) ; 2) <
U2(g (
00
2) ; 
00
2). It follows that on the graph (g (2) ; 2), U2 is either weakly monotonic everywhere,
or weakly increasing on ( 1; e2) and weakly decreasing on (e2;1) for some e2.
1
We now show that U2 cannot be constant on any interval along the graph. Suppose U2 assumes
the constant value k on the interval [02; 002]. Quasi-concavity implies that U2 is  k at the point
(y0; x0) =

g(02)+g(002)
2 ;
02+
00
2
2

. For su¢ ciently small  > 0, the box [y0; y0 + ] [x0; x0 + ] lies
entirely below and to the left of the curve C = f(g (2) ; 2) j 02 < 2 < 002g. Joint-monotonicity
ensures that U2 assumes a value k0 > k at some point (y0; x0) inside this box. Now, let S =
f(y; x) j y  y0; x  x0; U2(y; x)  U2(y0; x0)g. We know that S does not intersect C because
U2  k0 on S, whereas U2 takes on the constant value k on C, by assumption. S is closed and
convex, and must then be bounded (by the lines y = y0; x = x0, as well as by the curve C since
(y0; x0) 2 S), so it is compact. Hence we can choose a point (y; x) 2 S with x + y maximal. But
by joint-monotonicity there exists y00 > y0; x00 > x0 with U2(y00; x00) > U2(y0; x0)  k0, contradicting
maximality. It follows that U2 cannot be constant on [02; 002] after all.
Next, we rule out that U2 is monotonic along the entire graph; in particular, we show that for
any (g (2) ; 2), there are 02 < 2 < 002 such that U2(g (02) ; 02) < U2(g (2) ; 2) > U2(g (002) ; 002).
Since the graph is weakly concave, the indi¤erence curve going through (g (2) ; 2) is either tangent
to the budget curve or by TA2 intersects it at (g (2) ; 2) and at some other point (g (0002 ) ; 0002 ).
In either cases, the claim follows immediately.
We complete the proof by showing that each budget curve has a graph of the form (g (2) ; 2),
where g is a continuous, decreasing, weakly concave function; we omit the proof of the same
for the MPE frontier, for which the argument is analogous (and is a standard result about the
utility possibility frontierwhen utility is purely self-regarding). Fix action a1. Let the budget
curve B (a1)  f ! (a1; a2)ga22R be parameterized by 1 (a1; a2)  g (2 (a1; a2)); clearly, g is
not only continuous but also continuously di¤erentiable with d1d2

B(a1)
= dgd2 . Di¤erentiating
1 (a1; a2)  g (2 (a1; a2)) with respect to a2 yields @1@a2 =
dg
d2
@2
@a2
, and therefore d1d2

B(a1)
=
dg
d2
= @1=@a2@2=@a2 < 0. Hence g is decreasing. By the chain rule,
@
@a2

dg
d2

= d
2g
d(2)
2
@2
@a2
. Rearranging,
d2g
d(2)
2 =
@
@a2

dg
d2

@2=@a2
=
@
@a2

@1=@a2
@2=@a2

@2=@a2
. A3 implies that @@a2

@1=@a2
@2=@a2

 0, and A1 implies that @2@a2 < 0,
so d
2g
d(2)
2  0. Hence g is weakly concave.

Proposition 1 (Rotten kid theorem). In the equilibrium of the rotten kid game, the child
chooses the level of a1 that maximizes family income.
Proof: Follows directly from Theorem 3 below, and here we merely check that the assumptions
can be veried or appropriately modied. A1-A4 from Section 3 clearly hold, with A2 following from
2
n0 (0) < 1. TA1 from Section 4 and joint-monotonicity of U2 are satised due to the assumption
that U2 (1; 2) is monotonically increasing in both 1 and 2. TA2 from Section 4 is implied
by the assumption that there exist 1 < 0 and 2 < 0 such that lim2!1
@U2(1;2)=@2
@U2(1;2)=@1
= 0 and
lim1!1
@U2(1;2)=@2
@U2(1;2)=@1
= 1. We have directly assumed that U2 is quasi-concave and normal, and
U1 is purely self-regarding. The material payo¤ functions being quasi-linear implies that they are
globally conditionally transferable. There is no assumption that U1
 
a1; a2
  0 because neither
player has an outside option.

Proposition 2. In the gift-exchange game with a prot-maximizing rm, there exists  > 0
such that if  <  and   12 , then the equilibrium transaction is Pareto e¢ cient in terms of the
material payo¤s.
Proof: Follows directly from Theorem 4 below, and here we merely check that the assumptions
can be veried or appropriately modied. A1-A4 from Section 3 clearly hold, with A2 following
from c0 (0) < 1. TA1 from Section 4 clearly holds. TA2 from Section 4 and the quasi-concavity of U2
are not needed because the piecewise-linear functional form for U2, combined with the assumptions
regarding the material payo¤ functions, ensure that an optimal action for the worker exists in
response to any a1. The functional form for U2 satises joint-monotonicity and fairness-kinkedness,
and we have directly assumed that U1 is purely self-regarding. S2 from Section 8.2 clearly holds.
S3 can be replaced in the proof of Theorem 4 by the assumption of the piecewise-linear functional
form for U2. S4 and S5 hold but can be dropped as su¢ cient conditions because FM is purely
self-regarding. S1 is satised as long as (1  )  c0 (ba2) > 0; or rearranging,  < 11+c0(ba2) . In the
next paragraph, we will show that the assumption that
 
a1; a2

is a strict fairness-rule optimum is
satised as long as  < 12 and  >
1
2 . The conclusion then follows from setting  = min
n
1
2 ;
1
1+c0(ba2)
o
and noting (as explained below) that here  > 12 can be weakened to   12 .
We now show that
 
a1; a2

, dened implicitly as the solution to 1
 
a1; a2

= 2
 
a1; a2

and
c0
 
a2

= 1, satises U1
  !  a1; a2 = 1  a1; a2 > 0 and is a fairness-rule optimum. (Given the
assumptions on the material payo¤ functions and the c () function, the solution to these equations
exists and is unique.) The conditions on c () ensure that the solutions to these equations indeed
satisfy 1
 
a1; a2

> 0. Translated to this gift-exchange game, the two conditions for
 
a1; a2

to be a strict fairness-rule optimum (as dened in Section 5) are (1  )   c0  a2 > 0 and
(1  )  c0  a2  < 0. Substituting c0  a2 = 1, these two conditions are satised as long as  < 12
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and  > 12 , respectively. The latter condition can be weakened to   12 because if  = 12 , a1
remains a local optimum for FM since (1  )  c0 (a2)  < 0 continues to hold for all a2 < a2.

Lemma 1. Suppose U2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. For any a1, SM has a unique
optimal best response, a2 (a1), that is a continuous function of a1. Moreover, if U2 is continuously
di¤erentiable at some (ba1; a2 (ba1)), then @U2@1 > 0 and @U2@2 > 0 at (ba1; a2 (ba1)).
Proof: Technical Lemma immediately gives existence and uniqueness of an optimal action
a2 (a1). The Maximum Theorem (e.g., Sundaram 1996, p.235) can now be applied (where we can
ignore the compactness requirement on the budget curve since we have already proved existence of
an optimal action) to show that a2 (a1) is an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence. Since a2 (a1)
is single-valued, it is a continuous function.
Since U2 is continuously di¤erentiable at
 ! (ba1; a2 (ba1)), SMs unique optimum is characterized
by the rst-order condition, @U2@a2 (
 ! (ba1; a2)) = 0, which after rearranging is @U2@2  p (ba1; a2) @U2@1 = 0.
Joint-monotonicity rules out that both partial derivatives @U2@1 and
@U2
@2
are negative, and TA1 rules
out that they both equal 0. Therefore, the rst-order condition implies that both are positive.

Proposition 3.
1. Suppose U2 is joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, and fairness-kinked. Suppose that (ba1; a2 (ba1))
is a strict fairness-rule optimum. Then (a1; a2 (a1)) is a strict fairness-rule optimum for all
a1 in a neighborhood of ba1, and a2 (a1) is increasing in a1 at ba1. Furthermore, U2 is locally
normal in 1 and 2 at (p (ba1; a2 (ba1)) ; I (ba1; a2 (ba1))).
2. Suppose @@a1

@1=@a2
@2=@a2

 0 and U2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. If U2 is weakly
locally normal at (p (ba1; a2 (ba1)) ; I (ba1; a2 (ba1))), then a2 (a1) is increasing in a1 at ba1. Hence
if U2 is weakly normal in 1, then a2 (a1) is increasing in a1.
Proof of part 1: By denition of (ba1; a2 (ba1)) being a strict fairness-rule optimum:
lim !! ! (ba1;a2(ba1)); ! 2Df

@U2 (
 ! )
@2
  p (ba1; a2 (ba1)) @U2 ( ! )
@1

> 0;
and
lim !! ! (ba1;a2(ba1)); ! 2Af

@U2 (
 ! )
@2
  p (ba1; a2 (ba1)) @U2 ( ! )
@1

< 0:
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Since these inequalities are strict and since a2 (a1) is a continuous function of a1 (by Lemma 1),
it follows immediately that these inequalities hold for all a1 in a neighborhood of ba1, and thus
(a1; a2 (a1)) is a strict fairness-rule optimum for all a1 in a neighborhood of ba1. Thus, for any a1 in
a neighborhood of ba1, SM will choose action a2 (a1) such that  ! (a1; a2 (a1)) 2 graph(f). The fact
that the fairness rule is a strictly upward-sloping locus of material payo¤ pairs, together with A1,
implies that a2 (a1) is increasing in a1 at ba1. Because the above inequalities are strict, they also
imply that for any a1 in a neighborhood of ba1,
lim !! ! (a1;a2(a1)); ! 2Df

@U2 (
 ! )
@2
  p (ba1; a2 (ba1)) @U2 ( ! )
@1

> 0
and
lim !! ! (a1;a2(a1)); ! 2Af

@U2 (
 ! )
@2
  p (ba1; a2 (ba1)) @U2 ( ! )
@1

< 0
(where note that we are now holding the price xed at p (ba1; a2 (ba1)) as a1 varies). It follows that
U2 is locally normal in 1 and 2 at (p (ba1; a2 (ba1)) ; I (ba1; a2 (ba1))).
Proof of part 2: Consider a small increase in FMs action ba01 > ba1. Assume (for contradiction)
that SM weakly decreases his action, so that SMs material payo¤ rises while FMs falls. Call A the
allocation  ! (ba1; a2 (ba1)) and B the allocation  ! (ba01; a2 (ba01)). In the (2; 1) plane, A is northwest
of B. Now draw two downward-sloping lines with slopes  p (ba1; a2 (ba1)) and  p (ba01; a2 (ba01)) 
 p (ba1; a2 (ba1)) going through A and B, respectively; this inequality is implied by @p@a2  0 (by Part
2 of the Technical Lemma) and   @@a1

@1=@a2
@2=@a2

= @p@a1  0 (by hypothesis). If these two slopes are
equal, then weak local normality is contradicted. We can therefore assume that  p (ba01; a2 (ba01)) <
 p (ba1; a2 (ba1)), so that the slope of the line through B is steeper than the slope of the line through
A.
The two lines will intersect at some generic point, say C. There are three cases. Case 1 is
that C is strictly southeast of both A and B, and Case 2 is that C is strictly southeast of A and
northwest of B. The proof in these two cases proceeds identically: The change from A to B can be
decomposed into a substitution e¤ect and an income e¤ect. The substitution e¤ect causes a move
from A to a point A0 weakly northwest of A. Because of weak normality in 1, the income e¤ect
then makes us move from A0 to B, where B needs to be weakly north of A0 and therefore weakly
north of A. But B actually lies strictly south of A, a contradiction.
Case 3 is that C is strictly northwest of both A and B. The change from A to B can again be
decomposed into a substitution e¤ect and an income e¤ect, where the substitution e¤ect causes a
move from A to a point A0 weakly northwest of A. Because of weak normality in 2, the income
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e¤ect then makes us move from A0 to B, where B needs to be weakly west of A0 and therefore
weakly west of A. But B actually lies strictly east of A, a contradiction.

Theorem 1. Suppose U1 is monotonic and quasi-concave, and suppose U2 is joint-monotonic and
quasi-concave. FMs and SMs favorite transactions, (a1; a2) and
 
a1; a2

, exist and are unique.
The set of UPE material payo¤ pairs coincides exactly with the set of material payo¤ pairs on the
MPE frontier between (1; 2) and
 
1; 2

.
Proof: We will prove that SMs favorite transaction exists, and deduce the result for FM by
symmetry. If SMs favorite transaction exists, then joint-monotonicity implies that it must lie on
the MPE frontier. Technical Lemma implies that there does in fact exist a maximizing material
payo¤pair on the MPE frontier, and it is unique. Since this payo¤pair is on the MPE frontier, there
is in turn exactly one transaction
 
a1; a2

that achieves these payo¤s. To see that, we will work
in the (a1; a2) plane and study the material indi¤erence curves for FM and SM. At a MPE action
pair, we must have a tangency between the material indi¤erence curves:  @1=@a1@1=@a2 =
da2
da1

1=1
=
da2
da1

2=2
=  @2=@a1@2=@a2 . By A3,
d2a2
d(a1)
2

1=1
 0 and d2a2
d(a1)
2

2=2
 0 with at least one of these
equalities strict. It follows that SMs favorite transaction is unique.
FMs favorite material payo¤ pair (1; 2) is UPE because there is no alternative feasible mate-
rial payo¤ pair that FM prefers. Analogously, SMs favorite material payo¤s pair
 
1; 2

is UPE
because there is no alternative feasible material payo¤ pair that SM prefers.
Note that no material payo¤ pair (01; 02) that is strictly within the materially-feasible set can
be UPE; by joint-monotonicity of U2, there is some feasible material payo¤ pair (001; 002) (01; 02)
that SM prefers, and FM also prefers (001; 002) by monotonicity.
Finally, any material payo¤ pair (01; 02) on the MPE frontier between (1; 2) and
 
1; 2

is
UPE. For contradiction, suppose (01; 02) is not UPE. Then there exists another material payo¤pair
(001; 002) giving at least equally high utility to both players. We may assume (001; 002) to be MPE; if
not, then by joint-monotonicity, there exists an MPE material payo¤ pair giving yet higher utility
to both players that we can use instead. Suppose (1; 2) is northwest of
 
1; 2

on the MPE
frontier; the argument is analogous if the positioning is reversed. If (001; 002) is northwest of (01; 02)
on the MPE frontier, then (001; 002) ; (01; 02) ;
 
1; 2

lie in that order along the MPE frontier, and
U2 (
00
1; 
00
2)  U2 (01; 02) < U2
 
1; 2

; but this contradicts the Technical Lemma. On the other
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hand, if (001; 002) is southeast of (01; 02) on the MPE frontier, then (1; 2) ; (01; 02) ; (001; 002) lie
in that order along the MPE frontier, and U1 (1; 2) > U1 (01; 02)  U1 (001; 002); but this also
contradicts the Technical Lemma.

Lemma 2. Suppose U2 is joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. Then there exists a unique ba1 such
that the resulting transaction (ba1; a2 (ba1)) is MPE. This transaction is SMs favorite transaction 
a1; a2

, and it is UPE.
Proof: We will prove that given any action ba1, the transaction (ba1; a2 (ba1)) resulting from the
unique best-response a2 (ba1) is MPE if and only if (ba1; a2 (ba1)) is SMs favorite transaction. The if
direction follows immediately from the fact that SMs favorite transaction is MPE (Theorem 1), so
we focus on the only ifdirection. Suppose (ba1; a2 (ba1)) is MPE but is not SMs favorite transaction 
a1; a2

. Every point on the MPE frontier  ! (a1; a2) touches exactly one budget curve, B (a1); the
transaction (a1; a2) satises the MPE condition
@1=@a1
@1=@a2
= @2=@a1@2=@a2 , which implies
d1
d2

MPE
=
@1=@a1
@2=@a1
= @1=@a2@2=@a2 =
d1
d2

B(a1)
, and therefore the budget curve is tangent to the MPE frontier at
 ! (a1; a2). Hence SMs indi¤erence curve passing through  ! (ba1; a2 (ba1)) is tangent to the MPE
frontier at  ! (ba1; a2 (ba1)). So there is some  ! (a01; a02) on the MPE frontier between  ! (ba1; a2 (ba1))
and  !  a1; a2, su¢ ciently close to  ! (ba1; a2 (ba1)), such that U2( ! (a01; a02)) < U2( ! (ba1; a2 (ba1))).
But this contradicts the fact that U2 is strictly decreasing as we move away from
 !  a1; a2 along
the MPE frontier (as stated in Technical Lemma).
Finally, Theorem 1 states that SMs favorite transaction is UPE.

Lemma 3. An equilibrium exists. Moreover, if U1
 
1; 2
  0, then an equilibrium exists in
which the players exchange rather than taking their outside options.
Proof: From Lemma 2, if FM chooses action a1, SM will choose action a2. The facts that
U2 (
 ! (0; 0)) = 0 and  a1; a2 is SMs favorite transaction imply that U2   !  a1; a2  0. Since
some action other than a1 may give FM an even higher utility than U1
  !  a1; a2  0, 0 is a
lower bound on FMs equilibrium utility. From Technical Lemma, the set of individually-rational
transactions T is compact. Since U1 (
 ! (a1; a2 (a1))) is continuous, there exists an optimal action
a1 in T . The result follows.

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Proposition 4. Suppose U1 and U2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. If the equilibrium
(a1; a2 (a1)) is MPE, then (a1; a2 (a1)) is SMs favorite transaction, and U1 (
 ! (a1; a2 (a1)))  0.
Proof: The fact that (a1; a2 (a1)) is SMs favorite transaction follows directly from Lemma
2. Suppose that U1 (
 ! (a1; a2 (a1))) < 0. Then FM would choose her outside option rather than
taking action a1, so (a1; a2 (a1)) is not an equilibrium. But this is a contradiction.

Theorem 2. Suppose U1 and U2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave, and U2 is either twice-
continuously di¤erentiable or fairness-kinked. If the equilibrium (a1; a2 (a1)) is MPE, then at least
one of the following must be true:
1. (a1; a2 (a1)) is FMs favorite transaction.
2. dp(a1;a2(a1))da1 = 0.
3. U2 is fairness-kinked, and (a1; a2 (a1)) is a fairness-rule optimum.
Proof: SMs best-response function a2 (a1) solves the problem of choosing SMs most-preferred
material payo¤ pair along the budget curve B (a1):
(1 (a1; a2 (a1)) ; 

2 (a1; a2 (a1))) = arg max !
U2 (
 ! ) subject to  ! 2 B (a1) : (1)
As described in the text and illustrated in Figure 2, the solution to this problem,  ! , is the same
as the solution to the standard consumer optimization where the budget line is the linear approxi-
mation to the budget curve at the solution  !  (a1; a2 (a1)) to the problem (1):
(e1 (p; I) ; e2 (p; I)) = arg max ! U2 ( ! ) subject to 1 + p2 = I; (2)
where p = p (a1; a2 (a1)) =   d1d2

B(a1)
and I = 1 (a1; a2 (a1)) + p (a1; a2 (a1))2 (a1; a2 (a1)).
Since U2 is either twice-continuously di¤erentiable or fairness-kinked, p (a1; a2 (a1)), I (a1; a2 (a1)),e1 (p; I), and e2 (p; I) are all continuously di¤erentiable functions. Now, there are two possible
cases, depending on whether the change in FMs action leads to a change in p:
Case 1: dp(a1;a2(a1))da1 6= 0. The Slutsky equation can be applied to nd the e¤ects on e1 and e2:
d
da1
e1 (p; I) = de1 (p; e1 + pe2)
dp
+
@e1 (p; I)
@I
(!1   1)
d
da1
e2 (p; I) = de2 (p; e1 + pe2)
dp| {z }
substitution e¤ect
+
@e2 (p; I)
@I
(!2   2)| {z }
income e¤ect
8
where 1 and 2 are the solutions from (1), (!1; !2) is the material payo¤ pair where the original
budget line intersects with the new budget line (in standard consumer theory, this intersection point
would be interpreted as the endowment consumption bundle), and we omit writing the dependence
of p and I on (a1; a2 (a1)) to avoid cluttering notation.
To calculate the income e¤ect, we begin by nding (!1; !2). We suppress dependence on a2 (a1)
by writing the equation for the budget line as 1 (a1) = I (a1)   p (a1)2 (a1). Since (!1; !2) is
the intersection of the old budget line and the new budget line, it satises !1 = I (a1)   p (a1)!2
and !1 = I (a1 + a1)   p (a1 + a1)!2. Solving these two equations simultaneously gives !2 =
I(a1+a1) I(a1)
p(a1+a1) p(a1) =
I(a1+a1) I(a1)
a1
p(a1+a1) p(a1)
a1
, so for small a1,
!2 =
dI (a1) =da1
dp (a1) =da1
and !1 = I (a1)  p (a1)!2:
We now calculate (!1   1) and (!2   2). Using the denition of I, dI(a1)da1 =
dp(a1)
da1
2 (a1) +
p (a1)
d2(a1)
da1
+
d1(a1)
da1
. Substituting and simplifying gives
(!2   2) =
p (a1; a2 (a1))
d2(a1;a2(a1))
da1
+
d1(a1;a2(a1))
da1
dp(a1;a2(a1))
da1
=
p (a1; a2 (a1))
@2(a1;a2(a1))
@a1
+
@1(a1;a2(a1))
@a1
dp(a1;a2(a1))
da1
= 0:
The second equality can be intepreted as an envelope condition: the indirect e¤ect through a2,
p (a1; a2 (a1))
@2(a1;a2(a1))
@a2
+
@1(a1;a2(a1))
@a2
= 0, equals zero because, at a xed p = p (a1; a2 (a1)),
SM has maximized incomeby choosing the material payo¤ pair on the MPE frontier. The third
equality follows from p    d1d2

B(a1)
=  @1(a1;a2)=@a2@2(a1;a2)=@a2 and the MPE condition,
@1(a1;a2)=@a2
@2(a1;a2)=@a2
=
@1(a1;a2)=@a1
@2(a1;a2)=@a1
. Now, substituting !2 = 2 into the equation for !1 gives !1 = I (a1)  p (a1)2, but
since this expression equals 1, (!1   1) = 0. Therefore, starting from an MPE transaction, the
income e¤ect from a change in FMs action equals zero.
To calculate the substitution e¤ect, we dene eI (p) = pe2 + e1 and use the implicit function
theorem on the rst-order condition for problem (2),
@U2(eI pe2;e2)
@2
  p@U2(eI pe2;e2)@1 = 0:
de2 (p; e1 + pe2)
dp
=  
@2U2
@1@2

deI(p)
dp   e2  @U2@1   p @2U2@(1)2 deI(p)dp   e2
@2U2
@(2)
2   2p @2U2@1@2 + p2 @
2U2
@(1)
2
=  
 

@U2
@1
3
@2U2
@(2)
2

@U2
@1
2   2@U2@1 @U2@2 @2U2@1@2 + @U2@2 2 @2U2@(1)2 =
1
  d22
d(1)
2

U2(1;2)
;
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where the second equality follows from d
eI(p)
dp = e2 and substituting SMs rst-order condition for
problem (2). A similar calculation yields de1(p; pe1+e2)dp = pd22=d(1)2j
U2(1;2)
:
An interior equilibrium transaction satises FMs rst-order condition, which can be written in
terms of the budget lines: dda1U1 (e1 (p; I) ; e2 (p; I)) = 0. (A4 combined with joint-monotonicity
of U2 ensures that SMs favorite transaction is indeed interior.) Using the income and substitution
e¤ects derived above,
d
da1
U1 (e1 (p; I) ; e2 (p; I)) = @U1
@1
d
da1
e1 (p; I) + @U1
@2
d
da1
e2 (p; I)
=

@U1
@2
  p@U1
@1

 1
  d22
d(1)
2

U2(1;2)
:
Recall that @U1@1 > 0 and
@U1
@2
> 0 (from Lemma 1). Hence FMs rst-order condition is satised only
if (A) SMs indi¤erence curve is kinked at (1; 2), i.e., d22=d (1)
2

U2(1;2)
=  1; or (B) FMs
favorite transaction is (1; 2), i.e.,
@U1=@2
@U1=@1
= p at (1; 2), which is also SMs favorite transaction.
Case 2: dp(a1;a2(a1))da1 = 0. Since there is no substitution e¤ect, the new and old budget lines do
not intersect at an endowment(!1; !2). In this case, the Slutsky equation is:
d
da1
e1 (p; I) = @e1 (p; I)
@I
dI (a1; a2 (a1))
da1
d
da1
e2 (p; I) = @e2 (p; I)
@I
dI (a1; a2 (a1))
da1| {z }
income e¤ect
:
Di¤erentiating I (a1; a2 (a1)) = p (a1; a2 (a1))2 (a1; a2 (a1)) + 1 (a1; a2 (a1)) gives
dI (a1; a2 (a1))
da1
=

@1
@a1
+ p
@2
@a1

+

@1
@a2
+ p
@2
@a2

da2 (a1)
da1
+
dp (a1; a2 (a1))
da1
2
=
@1
@a1
+ p
@2
@a1
= 0
In the rst line, the third term is zero by hypothesis, and the second term is zero using the
envelope theorem as above. The third equality follows from an analogous envelope observation:
for xed p = p (a1; a2 (a1)), FMs action a1 maximizes income since (a1; a2 (a1)) is MPE. Since the
income e¤ect is zero, FMs rst-order condition is clearly satised: dda1U1 (e1 (p; I) ; e2 (p; I)) =
@U1
@1
d
da1
e1 (p; I) + @U1@2 dda1 e2 (p; I) = 0.

Theorem 3. Suppose U2 is joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, and normal. Suppose the material
payo¤ functions are globally conditionally transferable. If U1 is monotonic or purely self-regarding,
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and if U1
  !  a1; a2  0, then the unique equilibrium transaction is the e¢ cient transaction 
a1; a2

.
Proof: Since the material payo¤ functions are globally conditionally transferable, the budget
curves are all parallel lines with slope  p    d1d2

B(a1)
= @2(a1;a2)=@a2@1(a1;a2)=@a2 =  k for some k > 0.
Because U2 is normal, SMs best-response function a2 (a1) ensures that 1 and 2 are both strictly
increasing in I (a1). Since U1 is monotonic or purely self-regarding, FM maximizes her utility by
taking the action ea1 that maximizes I (a1). This is the action ea1 = a1 that induces SMs favorite
transaction because that is the unique action that induces an MPE transaction (by Lemma 2).
Since U1
 
a1; a2
  0, this action gives FM at least as high utility as her outside option and is
therefore the unique equilibrium.

Theorem 4. Suppose U2 is joint-monotonic, quasi-concave, and fairness-kinked. Assume S1-S5.
If U1 is monotonic or purely self-regarding, if
 
a1; a2

is a strict fairness-rule optimum, and if
U1
  !  a1; a2  0, then the unique equilibrium transaction is the e¢ cient transaction  a1; a2.
Proof: We rst show that (ba1;ba2) exists and is the unique transaction satisfying 1(ba1;ba2) =
1
 
a1; a2

, U2 (
 ! (ba1;ba2)) = 0, and ba1 < a1. Given A1, A3, and A4, clearly there is a unique
material payo¤ pair on SMs U2 = 0 indi¤erence curve such that 1 = 1
 
a1; a2

, so (ba1;ba2) exists.
Call that material payo¤ pair
 
1; b2. Clearly b2 < 2 (since all feasible material payo¤ pairs
(1; 2) 6=
 
1; 2

with 1 = 1 have 2 < 2). In the remainder of this paragraph, we show that
(ba1;ba2) is unique and satises (ba1;ba2)  a1; a2. Dene ea2 (a1) implicitly by 1(a1;ea2 (a1)) = 1,
which is a continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing function (by A1): dea2(a1)da1 =  @1=@a1@1=@a2 > 0.
It is also weakly convex:
d2ea2 (a1)
d (a1)
2 =
 @21(a1;ea2(a1))
@(a1)
2
@1
@a2
  @21(a1;ea2(a1))@a1@a2 dea2(a1)da1 @1@a2 + @1@a1

@21(a1;ea2(a1))
@a1@a2
+ @
21
@(a2)
2
dea2(a1)
da1


@1
@a2
2
=
  @21
@(a1)
2
@1
@a2
+ @1@a1
@21
@(a2)
2
dea2(a1)
da1
@1
@a2
2  0;
where the second equality follows from substituting dea2(a1)da1 =  @1=@a1@1=@a2 , and the inequality follows
from A1, @
21
@(a1)
2  0 (due to A3), and dea2(a1)da1 > 0. Dene eea2 (a1; 2) implicitly by 2(a1;eea2) = 2,
which is a continuously di¤erentiable function, strictly increasing in a1, strictly decreasing in 2,
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and (due to A3) weakly concave in a1. By A3, we also know that ea2 (a1) is strictly convex oreea2 (a1; 2) is strictly concave in a1 (or both). From Theorem 1, we know there exists a unique a1
such that ea2 (a1) = eea2  a1; 2, which is a1. In the (a1; a2) plane, draw the graph of ea2 (a1) as an
increasing, convex curve and the graph of eea2  a1; 2 as an increasing, concave curve. These curves
are tangent at a1. Since b2 < 2 and eea2 (a1; 2) is decreasing in 2, draw the graph of eea2 (a1; b2)
as an upward shift of the graph of eea2  a1; 2. There are two intersections of the graphs of ea2 (a1)
and eea2 (a1; b2), one with (a1; a2)  a1; a2 and one with (a1; a2)  a1; a2. The latter is (ba1;ba2).
We next show that a1 is a local optimum for FM. By hypothesis,
 
a1; a2

is a strict fairness-
rule optimum. Therefore, Part 1 of Proposition 3 implies that (a1; a2 (a1)) is a strict fairness-rule
optimum for all a1 in a neighborhood of a1. It follows that a1 is a local optimum for FM, regardless
of whether her distributional preferences are purely self-regarding or monotonic.
In the remainder of the proof, we show that a1 is a global optimum for FM. To avoid cluttering
notation with limits, we dene the function UD2 , which fully characterizes SMs preferences in the
region of disadvantageous unfairness but is everywhere twice-continuously di¤erentiable: UD2 (
 ! ) 
U2 (
 ! ) for all  ! 2 Df , and

@UD2 (
 ! )
@1
;
@UD2 (
 ! )
@2

= lim ! 0! ! ; ! 02Df

@U2( ! 0)
@1
;
@U2( ! 0)
@2

for all  ! 2
graph(f). (We do not constrain UD2 in the region of advantageous unfairness because we will not
use it there.) Now, it will be helpful in what follows to prove a preparatory claim.
Preparatory claim: We claim that
@UD2
@2
  p(a1;ba2)@UD2
@1
> 0
at all individually-rational transactions (a1; a2) such that 1(a1; a2) > 1
 
a1; a2

.
To prove it, suppose to the contrary there were some  ! (a1; a2) at which @U
D
2
@2
 p(a1;ba2)@UD2@1  0;
we will rst show that @U
D
2
@1
 0. There are two cases. When @UD2@2  p(a1;ba2)@UD2@1 = 0, @UD2@1 and @UD2@2
have the same sign since p(a1;ba2) > 0, and so @UD2@1  0 there (else joint-monotonicity is violated).
And when @U
D
2
@2
  p(a1;ba2)@UD2@1 < 0, we must again have @UD2@1  0 (else @UD2@2 < 0, violating joint-
monotonicity). Now that we have established that @U
D
2
@1
 0, we know that by choosing a value k
slightly larger than p(a1;ba2), we must have
@UD2
@2
  k@U
D
2
@1
< 0
at  ! (a1; a2). Since k is very close to p(a1;ba2), using S1, we also know that
@UD2
@2
  k@U
D
2
@1
> 0
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at  !  a1; a2. Drawing budget lines l; l0 each with slope  k passing through the two points
 !  a1; a2 and  ! (a1; a2), respectively, the above inequalities imply that SMs most-preferred point
on l is below 1
 
a1; a2

and his most-preferred point on l0 is above 1(a1; a2). By assumption,
1(a1; a2) > 1
 
a1; a2

. Since  !  a1; a2 lies on the MPE frontier, which is downward sloping and
concave, l is to the right of l0. So S3 (the normality assumption) is violated; a contradiction. This
proves the Preparatory Claim.
We will prove that a1 is the global optimum for FM in two cases, but before proceeding, we
note three useful facts.
First, at any individually-rational transaction such that 1(a1; a2) = 1(ba1;ba2) and 2(a1; a2) >
2(ba1;ba2) we must have (a1; a2)  (ba1;ba2). Suppose not. In that case, since A1 rules out
a1  ba1 and a2  ba2 or vice-versa, it must be that (a1; a2)  (ba1;ba2). Assuming for now that
da2
da1

1=1(ba1;ba2) < da2da1

2=2(ba1;ba2), then by A1 and weak concavity of 2 (from A3), 2(a1; a2) <
2(ba1;ba2); a contradiction. We now show that da2da1 1=1(ba1;ba2) < da2da1

2=2(ba1;ba2). Recall from the
argument in the rst paragraph of this proof that (ba1;ba2) is the unique intersection of the graphs ofea2 (a1) and eea2 (a1; b2) such that (ba1;ba2)  a1; a2. Since the graphs of ea2 (a1) and eea2  a1; 2 are
tangent at a1,
dea2(a1)
da1
=
@eea2(a1;2)
@a1
. Since ea2 (a1) is increasing and convex, dea2(ba1)da1 < dea2(a1)da1 . Due to
S2 (in particular, SMs material payo¤ function being additively separable), eea2 (a1; 2) is additively
separable, and since it is also increasing and concave in a1,
@eea2(ba1;2(ba1;ba2))
@a1
=
@eea2(ba1;2)
@a1
>
@eea2(a1;2)
@a1
.
Combining these observations and noting that dea2(ba1)da1 = da2da1

1=1(ba1;ba2) and @
eea2(ba1;2(ba1;ba2))
@a1
=
da2
da1

2=2(ba1;ba2), the needed inequality follows.
Second, due to S2 (the material payo¤ functions being additively separable), the slope of any
budget curve, p(a1; a2), does not depend on a1. Therefore,
@p(a1;a2)
@a1
= 0, and it thus follows from
the Technical Lemma that @p(a1;a2)@a2  0.
Third, since  !  a1; a2 2 graph(f), and since SMs fairness rule is strictly increasing, any
(1; 2) with 1  1
 
a1; a2

is in the region of disadvantageous unfairness, and thus we can use
UD2 .
Case 1: FM is purely self-regarding. To prove that a1 is the unique global optimum for FM,
it is su¢ cient to show that there does not exist any individually-rational transaction (a1; a2 (a1)) 6= 
a1; a2

that satises 1(a1; a2 (a1))  1
 
a1; a2

. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an
individually-rational transaction (a01; a2 (a01)) 6=
 
a1; a2

such that 1(a01; a2 (a01))  1
 
a1; a2

.
We rst show that without loss of generality, we can assume that (a01; a2 (a01)) 
 
a1; a2

. By
A1, the only other possibility is (a01; a2 (a01)) 
 
a1; a2

. But in that case, there exists (a001; a002) 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 
a1; a2

such that  ! (a001; a002) =  ! (a01; a2 (a01)) (this follows from an argument similar to that in
the rst paragraph of this proof). Since a002 > a2 (a01) and
@p(a1;a2)
@a2
 0, the change from the
budget line through (a01; a2 (a01)) to the budget line through (a001; a002) is a Slutsky-compensated
decrease in the price of FMs material payo¤, and thus SM chooses a higher material payo¤ for FM:
1(a
00
1; a2 (a
00
1))  1(a001; a002). Hence in the remainder of the proof, we can simply use (a001; a2 (a001))
in place of (a01; a2 (a01)) and relabel it as (a01; a2 (a01)).
Because  ! (a01; a2 (a01)) lies strictly in the interior of the region of disadvantageous unfairness
and a2 (a01) is a best response,
@UD2
@2
  p(a01; a2 (a01))@U
D
2
@1
= 0 at  ! (a01; a2 (a01)). We now show that
1(a
0
1; a2 (a
0
1)) = 1
 
a1; a2

leads to a contradiction (and then turn in the next paragraph to the
case 1(a01; a2 (a01)) > 1
 
a1; a2

). Clearly 2(a01; a2 (a01)) < 2
 
a1; a2

. Now consider (a0001 ; a0002 ) 
(a01; a2 (a01)) such that 1 (a0001 ; a0002 ) = 1(a01; a2 (a01)), 2(a01; a2 (a01)) < 2 (a0001 ; a0002 ) < 2
 
a1; a2

(the
existence of such a transaction follows from an argument similar to that in the rst paragraph of
this proof). We know that
@UD2 (
 ! (a01; a2 (a01)))
@2
  p(a01; a2
 
a01

)
@UD2 (
 ! (a01; a2 (a01)))
@1
>
@UD2 (
 ! (a0001 ; a0002 ))
@2
  p(a01; a2
 
a01

)
@UD2 (
 ! (a0001 ; a0002 ))
@1
 @U
D
2 (
 ! (a0001 ; a0002 ))
@2
  p(a1;ba2)@UD2 ( ! (a0001 ; a0002 ))
@1
;
where the rst inequality follows from S3 (the normality of U2), and the second inequality follows
from a2 (a01) > ba2, @p(a1;a2)@a2  0, and @p(a1;a2)@a1 = 0. Therefore,
@UD2 (
 ! (a0001 ; a0002 ))
@2
  p(a1;ba2)@UD2 ( ! (a0001 ; a0002 ))
@1
< 0;
but this is a contradiction because the Preparatory Claim implies that the left-hand side is  0.
We now show that 1(a01; a2 (a01)) > 1
 
a1; a2

also leads to a contradiction. By A1, there is a
unique transaction a02 that satises 1(a01; a02) = 1
 
a1; a2

, where a02 < a2 (a01). Draw budget lines
m;m0 with respective slopes  p(a01; a02) and  p(a01; a2 (a01)) passing through the two points  ! (a01; a02)
and  ! (a01; a2 (a01)). We know that at  ! (a01; a02), @U
D
2
@2
  p(a01; a02)@U
D
2
@1
 @UD2@2   p(a1;ba2)@UD2@1  0,
where the rst inequality follows from a02 > ba2, @p(a1;a2)@a2  0, and @p(a1;a2)@a1 = 0, and the sec-
ond inequality follows from the Preparatory Claim. Therefore, SMs most-preferred point on
line m yields a material payo¤ for FM that is weakly smaller than 1(a01; a02). By construction,
SMs most-preferred point on line m0 is  ! (a01; a2 (a01)). Now, draw a third line m00 with slope
 p(a01; a02)   p(a01; a2 (a01)) going through  ! (a01; a2 (a01)). Since moving from m0 to m00 can be
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thought of as a Slutsky-compensated price change, SMs most-preferred point on line m00 must
yield a material payo¤ for FM that is at least as large as 1(a01; a02). But comparing FMs material
payo¤ when moving from m00 to m reveals a violation of U2 being normal in 1 (the assumption
S3); a contradiction.
Case 2: FMs distributional preferences are strictly monotonic, and S4 and S5 hold.
We claim that there is no a01 6= a1 such that U1(a01; a2 (a01))  U1
 
a1; a2

. We showed in Case 1
that there is no a01 6= a1 such that 1(a01; a2 (a01))  1
 
a1; a2

. The result then follows from the
observation that, since U1 is monotonic, 1 (a1; a2) > 1
 
a1; a2

(from S4), and U1 is weakly quasi-
concave (from S5), the region enclosed by the upper-contour set of FMs U1 = U1
  !  a1; a2
indi¤erence curve and MPE frontier contains only material payo¤ pairs satisfying 1(a1; a2) >
1
 
a1; a2

. This completes the proof.

Theorem A1. Suppose U1 and U2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave. FMs and SMs
favorite transactions, (a1; a2) and
 
a1; a2

, exist and are unique. The set of UPE material payo¤
pairs is a connected set that includes (1; 2) and
 
1; 2

and lies within the region enclosed by
IC1, IC2, and the MPE frontier.
Proof: The proofs that (a1; a2) and
 
a1; a2

exist, are unique, and are UPE are the same as
in the proof of Theorem 1.
To see that the set of UPE material pairs is a connected set, consider the problem  !  U2 2
arg maxf ! : ! 2T ;U2( ! )=U2g U1 (
 ! ). The Maximum Theorem (e.g., Sundaram 1996, p.235) implies
that  !  U2 is an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence. It follows that  !  U2	U22[0;U2(1;2)]
is a connected set. But
 !  U2	U22[0;U2(1;2)] is exactly the set of UPE material payo¤ pairs.
There does not exist a UPE material payo¤ pair (b1; b2) outside of the region enclosed by IC1,
IC2, and the MPE frontier because by construction (b1; b2) is worse than (1; 2) or  1; 2 for
both FM and SM.

Theorem A2. Suppose U1 and U2 are joint-monotonic and quasi-concave, and both are either
twice-continuously di¤erentiable or fairness-kinked. If the equilibrium (a1; a2 (a1)) is UPE and not
MPE, then (a1; a2 (a1)) is a fairness-rule optimum for SM. If, in addition, (a1; a2 (a1)) is a strict
fairness-rule optimum for SM and any fairness rule is continuously di¤erentiable, then at least one
of the following must be true:  ! (a01; a2 (a01))
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1. SMs indi¤erence curve for disadvantageously unfair transactions is tangent to SMs fairness
rule at  ! (a1; a2 (a1)).
2. U1 is fairness-kinked,
 ! (a1; a2 (a1)) is on FMs fairness rule, and the respective fairness rules
f1 and f2 have di¤erent slopes at
 ! (a1; a2 (a1)).
Proof: We begin with the rst claim: if the equilibrium (a1; a2 (a1)) is UPE and not MPE, then
(a1; a2 (a1)) is a fairness-rule optimum for SM. We will prove that if the equilibrium (a1; a2 (a1))
is UPE and if U2 is continuously di¤erentiable at
 ! (a1; a2 (a1)), then  ! (a1; a2 (a1)) is also MPE.
Suppose not. Then  ! (a1; a2 (a1)) is in the interior of the materially-feasible set. Lemma 1 implies
that SMs distributional preferences are (locally) monotonic in a neighborhood of  ! (a1; a2 (a1)).
Since FMs distributional preferences are joint-monotonic, there is an alternative material payo¤
pair giving higher material payo¤ to both players that both players prefer. This contradicts UPE.
From now on, we assume that the equilibrium (a1; a2 (a1)) is UPE, is not MPE, and is a strict
fairness-rule optimum for SM, and we assume that any fairness rule is continuously di¤erentiable.
We next show that if U1 is continuously di¤erentiable at
 ! (a1; a2 (a1)), then SMs indi¤erence
curve for disadvantagously unfair transactions is tangent to SMs fairness rule at  ! (a1; a2 (a1)).
For contradiction, suppose that SMs indi¤erence curve for disadvantagously-unfair transactions
is not tangent to SMs fairness rule at  ! (a1; a2 (a1)): d1d2

UD2 =U
D
2 (
 ! (a1;a2(a1)))
6= f 0 (2). By a
similar argument to that in the previous paragraph, SMs distributional preferences cannot be
locally monotonic; therefore, SMs interpersonal indi¤erence curve at  ! (a1; a2 (a1)) is upward-
sloping. Since the indi¤erence curve also lies in the region of disadvantageous unfairness, it must
be that d1d2

UD2 =U
D
2 (
 ! (a1;a2(a1)))
> f 0 (2). Since  ! (a1; a2 (a1)) is not MPE, we know that it is in
the interior of the materially-feasible set, and this, together with  ! (a1; a2 (a1)) being UPE, implies
that d1d2

U1=U1( ! (a1;a2(a1)))
 d1d2

UD2 =U
D
2 (
 ! (a1;a2(a1)))
. Since (a1; a2 (a1)) is a strict fairness-rule
optimum for SM, Part 1 of Proposition 3 implies that there exists a slight deviation for FM such
that SMs optimal response would yield a material-payo¤ pair slightly southwest on SMs fairness
rule. But the above inequalities imply that d1d2

U1=U1( ! (a1;a2(a1)))
> f 0 (2) at  ! (a1; a2 (a1)),
meaning that FM would prefer this alternative material-payo¤ pair, contradicting that (a1; a2 (a1))
is an equilibrium.
Finally, we show that if U1 is fairness-kinked and
 ! (a1; a2 (a1)) is on FMs fairness rule, then
FMs and SMs respective fairness rules f1 and f2 have di¤erent slopes at
 ! (a1; a2 (a1)). For con-
tradiction, suppose instead that f1 and f2 have the same slope at
 ! (a1; a2 (a1)). Since (a1; a2 (a1))
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is a strict fairness-rule optimum for SM, Part 1 of Proposition 3 implies that there exists a slight de-
viation for FM such that SMs optimal response would yield a material-payo¤pair slightly northeast
along SMs fairness rule. We know that FM would prefer a su¢ ciently small northeast movement
along SMs fairness rule, contradicting that (a1; a2 (a1)) is an equilibrium.

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